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A PROPOSAL FOR MANDATORY
PRESELECTION SCREENING FOR STATE
COURT JUDGES
MARTIN
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KAMINSKY*

The debate whether state court judges should be elected or
appointed is no closer to resolution today than it has been at anytime during the past one hundred years.' Recently, however, both
* A.B., Yale University, 1962; LL.B., Harvard University, 1965. Member of the New
York Bar. The author wishes to thank Ms. JoAnn Cory for her invaluable assistance in the
preparation of this article.
' For a sampling of the arguments in favor of merit selection, see Garwood, Democracy
and the Popular Election of Judges: An Argument, 16 Sw. L.J. 216 (1962); Hall, Merit
Selection and Merit Election of Judges, 4 GA. ST. B.J. 169 (1967); Hays, Selection of Judges
in Oklahoma, 2 TULSA L. REv. 127 (1965); Nelson, Variations on a Theme Selectin and
Tenure of Judges, 36 S. CAL. L. REv. 4 (1962); Niles, The Changing Politics of Judicial
Selection: A Merit Plan for New York, 22 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 242 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as Changing Politics]; O'Connell & Means, Should Judges Be Selected by Merit Plan?, 40
FLA. B.J. 1146 (1966); Parsons, The Selection and Tenure of FloridaSupreme Court Judges,
9 MiAMi L.Q. 271 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Parsons]; Sears, JudicialSelection-The Horse
Before the Cart, 48 ILL. B.J. 272 (1959); Segal, NonpartisanSelection of Judges: Pennsylvania'sExperiment, 50 A.B.A.J. 830 (1964); Spaeth, Reflections on a JudicialCampaign, 60
JUDICATURE 10 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Spaeth]; Special Comm. on Revision of the N.Y.
St. Const., Selection of the Judiciary:ForAppointment, 24 N.Y. COUNTY B. BULL. 214 (1967);
Workbook prepared for The Citizens' Committee on the Merit Plan for Judicial Selection,
43 CAL. ST. B.J. 153 (1968); Comment, Judicial Selection and Tenure - A Merit Plan for
Arizona, 9 ARiz. L. REv. 297 (1967); Note, JudicialSelection and Tenure-The Merit Plan in
Ohio, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 255, 260 (1973); Note, JudicialSelection and Tenure in Indiana:A
CriticalAnalysis and Suggested Reform, 39 IND. L.J. 364 (1964); Note, JudicialSelection in
North Dakota-Is Constitutional Revision Necessary?, 48 N.D.L. REv. 327 (1972). See also
N.Y. Times, July 27, 1973, at 30, col. 2 (editorial); id., July 20, 1972, at 32, col. 2 (editorial);
id., Mar. 6, 1970, at 38, col. 2 (editorial).
For some arguments in favor of election, see E. CosTrKYAN, BEHIND CLOSED DooRs 173210 (1966); Desmond, 6 Good Judges-An Argument in Support of Elective Process, 171
N.Y.L.J. 17, Jan. 24, 1974, at 25, col. 1; Golomb, Selection of the Judiciary:For Election, 24
N.Y. COUNTY B. BULL. 215 (1967); Harding, The Case for PartisanElection of Judges, 55
A.B.A.J. 1162 (1969); Keefe, Judges and Politics: The PennsylvaniaPlanof Judge Selection,
20 U. Prrr. L. REv. 621 (1959); Roth, Why I Am Against the California Merit Plan, The
Missouri Plan-OrAny Reasonable Facsimile Thereof, 42 CAL. ST. B.J. 346 (1967); Spence,
Should Judges Be Selected by Merit Plan? No .. , 40 FLA. B.J. 1147 (1966).
An attempt to summarize the arguments pro and con is to be found in Kaminsky,
JudicialSelection: Alternatives to the Status Quo in the Selection of State Court Judges, 48
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 496, 508-15 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Kaminsky]. See also Seiler,
JudicialSelection in New Jersey, 5 SETON HALL L. REv. 721, 775-80 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Seiler]; Note, Judicial Selection in New York: A Need for Change, 3 FoRDHAM URB. L.J.
605 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Selection in New York]; Note, Judicial Selection
in the States: A Critical Study with Proposals for Reform, 4 HoFSTRA L. REv. 267 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Judicial Selection in the States].
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pro-election and pro-appointment advocates appear to have opened
their eyes to a pragmatic compromise proposal: mandatory preselection screening of all judges, whether appointed or elected. This Article outlines the historical background and basic tenets of this proposal, explains why it currently appears to provide the most promising reform measure, and discusses detailed suggested legislation
which would effectuate the screening proposal. Regardless of
whether adoption takes the form of a legislative measure or a constitutional amendment, although the latter does not seem necessary,
such preselection screening should be implemented as soon as possible.
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PRESELECTION SCREENING

Included in various reform proposals over the past sixty-five
years, mandatory preselection screening is not a new concept. 2 Yet,
reformers have only recently attempted to separate this aspect from
the other more complex proposals3 and offer it as a reform in and of
itself.4
The most widely publicized proposal for judicial reform is the
2 The attempt to limit membership in the judiciary to well-qualified individuals has a
long history. Indeed, the Magna Carta provided that the King would "appoint as justices...
only such as know the law of the realm and mean to observe it well." W. MCKEcHNIE, MAGNA
CARTA 431 (2d ed. 1960). See JudicialSelection in the States, supra note 1, at 276. Similarly,
at the time of the Revolutionary War, judges in New York were appointed by a Council of
Appointment. See AsS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CrrY OF N.Y., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMM. ON
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: SELECTION OF JUDGES, 2 (1967) [hereinafter cited as REPORT
OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE].

I For a summary of the history of judicial selection reform proposals in New York, see
Kaminsky, supra note 1, at 499-508; Niles, The PopularElection of Judges in Historical
Perspective, 21 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 523 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Niles].
I The first such proposal appears to have been advanced in Hunting, Toward the Best
Possible Judges, 15 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 400 (1960), where the following proposal was
suggested:
The goal which is sought is to restrict elevation to the bench to a group of men who
wish to be judges and who have high qualifications. This can be accomplished
entirely without relation to method of selection by this requirement: No person's
name shall be placed on a ballot for, nor shall any person be appointed to, judicial
office, unless he shall have been found to be qualified to be a judge. Evidence of
qualification shall be a "Certificate of Qualification" issued by a "State Board of
Judicial Qualification," to which any person who wished to be eligible for appointment or election to the bench could submit himself, with a request for a finding as
to his qualification.
Id. at 405-06. In 1970 a major legislative effort for such screening was mounted, albeit unsuccessfully, by New York Assemblymen Stephen C. Hansen and Perry Duryea. For the history
and details of the 1970 proposal, see Kaminsky, supra note 1, at 504-06; notes 19-21 and
accompanying text infra.
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so-called "merit system." 5 First suggested by the American JudicaThe advocates of the merit system of selecting the judiciary have presented compelling
arguments which do not require in depth repetition here. A brief summary is useful, however,
since they are also persuasive reasons for the adoption of a compromise reform such as
mandatory preselection screening. The present method of selecting judges is a historical
anachronism, a holdover from the Jacksonian rebellion against an unresponsive judiciary
controlled by landowners. See REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITrEE, supra note 2, at 2. The
essential thesis of the Jacksonian approach, that the judiciary would be responsive to the
citizenry under an elective system, was premised on the belief that through personal contact
local judges could be effectively evaluated by the electorate. In the context of our modem,
industrialized, and substantially urban society, and in view of the actual operation of the
elective system, the public no longer has the ability to exercise any significant supervision
and control over the judiciary. See Niles, supra note 3, at 529-31; Note, JudicialSelection
and Tenure in Indiana:A CriticalAnalysis and Suggested Reform, 39 IND. L. REv. 364, 36667 (1964). Available empirical evidence indicates that the public is almost completely unaware of the qualifications of judicial candidates and has tended to vote, if at all, along straight
party lines or at random. THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE CouRTs 66 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE
REPORT: THE COURTS]. For a detailed discussion of voter reaction to the court of dppeals
elections of 1973 and 1974, see C. PHILIP, P. NEJELSKI & A. PRESS, WHERE Do JUDGES COME
FROM? (1976) [hereinafter cited as PHILIP, NEJELSKI & PRESS].
Perhaps as a result of this voter ignorance and indifference, judicial elections have also
been plagued by the continuing pervasive control of political leaders. It is conceded by
politicians and by judges themselves, that backroom deals and political influence peddling
are often of great significance in the selection of judges, at least for the lower courts. Nominations are agreed upon even before the judicial nominating convention meets, see Rosenman,
A Better Way to Select Judges, 48 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 86, 88 (1964), and in localities where
one political party dominates, the bosses' handpicked candidates are virtually assured seats
on the bench. See, e.g., TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS, supra, at 67; Village Voice, Aug.
22, 1974, at 12, col. 4. As a result, this process places a premium on political qualifications
and too often overlooks the proposed candidate's ability to hold judicial office. TASK FORCE
REPORT: THE COURTS, supra, at 67. The effect of political influence upon the initial selection
process, however, is not the end of the problem. All too often either through allegiance to the
party or the necessity of reelection, judges who are supposed to be responsive to the people
become obliged to politicians instead. A.B.A. SECTION ON JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 45 (1971); see Lyman, Connecticut and the
Missouri Plan, 30 CONN. B.J. 390, 391-92 (1956).
The sadly tarnished public image of the judiciary provides further proof of the inadequacies of the elective system. While this system has produced some very fine state judges, it is
regrettable that knowledgeable observers consider many others undistinguished and mediocre. D. JACKSON, JUDGES 189 (1974); see, e.g., Reath, In Support of Constitutional Revision
to Providefor Merit Selection of All Judges, 45 PA. B.A.Q. 406, 407 (1974); Seiler, supra note
1, at 736-37. Mediocrity, in the context of the ever increasing burdens of judicial office, is
simply insufficient. As the American Judicature Society has stated: "Judicial office today
demands the best possible men, not those of merely average ability who are gray and undistinguished as lawyers and who will be just as drab as judges." American Judicature Society,
Report to Philadelphia Justice Consortium on Philadelphia's Criminal Justice System (Dec.
19, 1970), quoted in Reath, supra, at 407.
The most serious deficiency in our present system is the absence of any effective
mandatory preselection screening plan. The task has been largely assumed by local bar
associations which have neither the funds nor the staff to conduct detailed, comprehensive
studies of each judicial candidate's qualifications. Moreover, the bar associations themselves
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ture Society in 1913,1 the merit system has received the backing of
the American Bar Association7 and other prestigious civic and professional groups including the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York' and the President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and the Administration of Justice.' Under this system, judges are
appointed by the state's chief executive from a list of candidates
proposed to the governor by a blue-ribbon nominating commission.
Subsequently, the electorate is given the opportunity to decide
whether to retain the appointed judge. If the electorate reaches a
negative decision, the governor appoints a new judge from another
candidate list."0 Obviously, preselection screening is a fundamental
aspect of this system since certification by the nominating commission is a prerequisite to appointment." Nonetheless, of the approxiare not free of internal politics and bias. See Golomb, Selection of the Judiciary:For Election,
24 N.Y. CouNTY B. BULL. 215, 218 (1967). See also Atkins, Merit Selection of State Judges,
50 FLA. B.J. 203, 208 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Atkins]. It is clear that the stakes are simply
too high to continue on this way. The work load of our courts is tremendous. Every time we
select a judge who lacks qualifications, the temperament, or simply the diligence to be a
superior judge, the whole system suffers. Other judges must take on more work. Most importantly, the substantial rights of a litigant or the very life and liberty of a criminal defendant
are jeopardized each time an incompetent judge hands down a decision. Removal and judicial
discipline are not adequate solutions to the problem. Eventual removal of a judge offers little
solace and no redress to those who have already suffered as a result of his inadequacies. The
more rational answer is to review judicial candidates before they are either appointed or
elected to the bench.
6 7 BULL. AM. JuD. Soc'y 61, 84 (1914). See also Holt, The Model State JudicialArticle
in Perspective, 47 J. AM. JuD. Soc'y 6, 8 (1963).
7 See 23 A.B.A.J. 104-05, 108 (1937). See also Wood, Basic PropositionsRelating to
JudicialSelection-Failureof Direct Primary-Appointment Through Dual Agency-Judge
to "Run on Record", 23 A.B.A.J. 102, 104 (1937).
See REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITrEE, supra note 2. See also Kaminsky, supranote 1,
at 503; Lindsay, The Selection of Judges, 21 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 514, 518 (1966).
1 TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS, supra note 5, at 66-68.
10Literally scores of articles have been written on the development, nature, and virtues
of the merit system. One of the finest of these publications is Winters, A Better Way to Select
Our Judges, 34 J. AM. JuD. Soc'y 166 (1951). Also of particular assistance in understanding
the development of the merit plan is Winters, The Merit Plan for Judicial Selection and
Tenure-Its Historical Development, 7 DuQ. L. REv. 61 (1968). See also Nelson, Variations
on a Theme-Selection and Tenure of Judges, 36 S. CAL. L. REv. 4 (1962). Although there
are several different versions of the merit plan, most involve the following three-step process:
(1) proposal to the executive of a list of names of persons found to be highly qualified by a
nonpartisan nominating or screening committee; (2) appointment by the executive from such
a list; (3) an uncontested retention referendum within a year to three years after appointment.
See Alfini, JudicialSelection: Take Your Choice, TRALL, Jan. 1976, at 11.
11For a brief but incisive summary of the details of the merit plan and other selection
methods, see Alfini, Judicial Selection: Take Your Choice, TRIAL, Jan. 1976, at 11. The
nominating commission, which is the most important element of the merit plan, has been
described as follows:
The true nature of the judicial nominating commission is a group of people of
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mately twenty-five states which have adopted various aspects of the
merit plan,' 2 only about a dozen require preselection screening.'"
Beginning in the 1960's, some reformers, sensing the practical
difficulties involved in removing the selection process entirely from
the political leaders, began pressing for mandatory preselection
screening as a compromise position."4 Although a specific plan had
not been formulated, these reformers realized that the implementation of mandatory screening could accomplish the central goal of all
judicial reform proposals, viz. ensuring that every judge is highly
qualified. Additionally, it was becoming clear that a screening program could be adopted without fighting the appointment versus
election battle.'5
In 1967, a constitutional convention was convened in New York
State. At the convention, a considerable amount of debate centered
on the question whether judges should be elected or appointed. With
several knowledgeable and prestigious voices advocating sweeping
changes in the area of judicial selection, the reform most favored
was a switch to merit selection.'" Perhaps as a reaction to the debate
generated by the convention a number of local political leaders
modified their position and indicated possible receptiveness to some
form of preselection screening. Drawing upon the new tack which
intelligence and responsibility unconnected with government and politics who can
relieve the governor of some of the labor of making appointments and supply a nonpartisan objectivity that will make for higher grade judicial personnel.
Winters, One-Man JudicialSelection, 45 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 198, 202 (1962).
22 For a detailed analysis of which states have adopted the merit system, and to what
extent, see Atkins, supra note 5, at 204-07; JudicialSelection in the States, supra note 1, app.
V at 326-53; REP. No. 36, AM. JuD. Soc'Y, VOLUNTARY MERIT SELECTION PLANS (1972);
INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, A GUIDE TO COURT SYSTEMS 23-24 (5th ed. 1971); REP.
No. 18, AM. JUD. Soc'Y, THE EXTENT OF ADO'TION OF THE MERIT PLAN OF JUDICIAL SELECTION

AND TENURE (1970).
11 Some plans currently in effect involve only postselection confirmation or retention

election. See authorities cited in note 12 supra.
* See note 3 supra.
5 The chairman of the Judiciary Committee of the New York State Senate has emphasized that "any effort to bring about an across-the-board system for appointing all judges in
the state without any expression of choice by the voters will face impossible odds." Gordon,
JudicialReform: A Legislative Viewpoint, 48 N.Y. ST. B.J. 284, 286 (1976).
,1 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE, supra note 2. Nevertheless, the call for
merit selection went unheeded, see N.Y. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, SEEDS OF FAILURE 54

(1973), and the final proposed judiciary article recommended by the constitutional convention provided for continued election of New York State judges. N.Y.S. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, PROPOSED NEW CONSTITUTION 11-26 (1967). For an interesting insight into the deliberations of the convention on proposed amendments to the judiciary article calling for appointment of judges by the governor with the advice and consent of the legislature, see N.Y.S.
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE

CORD, PT. 2, at 839-92 (1967).

N.Y.S.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, RE-
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those suggesting preselection screening alone had taken, two New
York County political leaders proposed a plan whereby a preselection committee would submit names to the political parties prior to
the nomination of judicial candidates.1 7 Under their proposal, however, the possible judicial nominees of the political parties would
not be limited to the submitted names. Instead, the screening panel
would be given the right to "contest the party's designations" in the
election process, by taking a position on the ballot and doing political battle on the matter. Not surprisingly, this proposal garnered
little support among reformers.'"
The closest New York ever came to adopting the concept of
mandatory preselection screening was in 1970, when Assemblymen
Steven C. Hansen and Perry Duryea proposed a bill which would
have required all candidates for the state supreme court to be certified as "highly qualified" by a nonpartisan "judicial qualification
committee" before being permitted to run for office.' 9 At early press
conferences, the leaders of the New York State Senate pledged support for the Hansen-Duryea bill,2" but, at the last minute, they
balked at the concept of mandatory preselection screening and reneged on their pledge.2 ' Thus, the most promising judicial reform
effort in a century died a political death.
17Prendergast & Costikyan, Judicial Selection-The Prendergast Plan, pt. 1, 157
N.Y.L.J. 55, Mar. 22, 1967, at 4, col. 1; id. pt. 2, 157 N.Y.L.J. 56, Mar. 23, 1967, at 4, col. 1;
id. pt. 3, 157 N.Y.L.J. 57, Mar. 24, 1967, at 4, col. 1. One of these two politicians had
previously written that judicial election was necessary to preserve our system of party politics.
See E. COSTIKYAN, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS 173-221 (1966).
1 The Association of the Bar of the City of New York concluded that this plan was not
feasible:
In the first place, the Special Committee doubts that political parties will in fact
accept the candidates of a nominating commission where such candidates do not
also enjoy substantial "political" acceptability. Recognition of this factor could
have the effect of causing a nominating commission to compromise its convictions
in favor of candidates known to be acceptable to their respective political parties.
Moreover, the Special Committee believes the plan is wholly unrealistic in that it
would be nearly impossible for even the most active kind of judicial nominating
commission to sponsor and promote an election campaign which would defeat party
organizations in primary or general elections.
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMNTrrrEE, supra note 2, at 16. This plan was also discussed in
Curtiss, Screening Judicial Candidatesfor Election, 59 JUDICATURE 320 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Curtiss].
11For a summary of the bill and its legislative history, see N.Y. LEG. REc. A 3195A, at A
296, 193d Sess. (1970); Kaminsky, supra note 1, at 504-06.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1970, at 24, col. 2.
2, Id., Mar. 6, 1970, at 38, col. 2; id., June 23, 1970, at 20, col. 3. The Hansen-Duryea
bill was passed by the Assembly. It was, however, never reported out of the Senate Finance
Committee. N.Y. LEG. REc. A 3195A, at A 296, 193d Sess. (1970).
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The attempt to institute preselection screening in New York
has not been entirely unsuccessful. In 1975, Governor Carey adopted
such a program for those judicial positions which are filled by gubernatorial appointment.s This is a laudable step, and one which provides further encouragement for proponents of reform, although its
impact is, of course, far too limited to even begin to remedy the
problem.
More than 7 years after the defeat of the Hansen-Duryea bill
we still hear the same debate and the same refrains. 2 Nonetheless,
it is increasingly apparent that the idea of preselection screening as
a compromise which might be acceptable to both sides in the election versus appointment debate is gaining wider appeal.24 The time
may finally be ripe for this crucial reform.
2 See Exec. Order No. 5, 9A N.Y.C.R.R. 3.5 (1975), discussed in note 109 infra. New
York City Mayors Wagner, Lindsay, and Beame have also utilized preselection screening. See
note 112 infra. On the national level, President Carter has recently announced that his
appointments to the Federal appellate courts would be drawn from the recommendations of
judicial nominating commissions. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1977, § A, at 28, col. 1.
2 At a meeting of the New York County Lawyers' Association in June of 1976, the everpresent disagreement between members of the bar was illustrated by the statements of former
Chief Judge Stanley J. Fuld and Justice Harold Stephens. Chief Judge Fuld declared:
Some years ago, while I was Chief Judge, I said that the present elective system
"is unsuited to the filling of judicial vacancies. . . and not geared to the objective
of choosing the best qualified candidate." I recognize that the elective system has
produced many qualified, even great judges, but I firmly believe-to cull again from
a statement made when I was Chief Judge-"that it is impossible for the general
public, particularly in the metropolitan areas, to know what candidates possess the
necessary qualifications for judicial service."
N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n, Vesey Street Letter 1, 5 (June 1976). Justice Stephens stated:
In my opinion, Supreme Court justices should be elected, not appointed. To place
in the hands of one person, no matter who he might be, the power of appointment
of trial judges, especially as it affects this city or other urban centers, is to vest too
much power in a single person.
Id. at 5. Other distinguished jurists have similarly disagreed on this topic. Former Chief Judge
Charles Desmond has been one of the leading proponents of election. See, e.g., Desmond,
'Merit Selection' Isn't Easy Answer to Choose Judges, 173 N.Y.L.J. 15, Jan. 22, 1975, at 25,
col. 4; Desmond, 6 Good Judges-An Argument in Support of Elective Process, 171 N.Y.L.J.
17, Jan. 24, 1974, at 24, col. 1. The current chief judge of the court of appeals, Charles D.
Breitel, has announced his support for the appointment of all judges in the court system. See
173 N.Y.L.J. 85, May 2, 1975, at 1, col. 3. At hearings before the Joint Legislative Committee
on Court Reorganization in January 1975, Judge Richard J. Bartlett, the state's chief administrative judge, testified in favor of a merit plan of appointment, while Justice Owen McGivem spoke in favor of the present elective system. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1975, at 18, col.
1. The advantages of the election and appointment methods were again disputed at the 1976
hearings of the Select Task Force on Court Reorganization, the successor of the Joint Legislative Committee on Court Reorganization. See 175 N.Y.L.J. 34, Feb. 20, 1976, at 1, col. 2.
2, See, e.g., O'Connor, An Argument for the Election of Judges, 175 N.Y.L.J. 29, Feb.
11, 1976, at 1, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1975, at 38, col. 2 (editorial); Curtiss, supra note
18, at 320-23. Not everyone agrees, of course, that preselection screening by a small panel is
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THE BEST AVAILABLE COMPROMISE: MANDATORY PRESELECTION
SCREENING

The principal problem currently facing advocates of judicial
reform is the need to develop a compromise proposal which will be
effective and also have a reasonable chance of successful adoption.
Senator Bernard Gordon and the Select Task Force on Court Reorganization 5 have decided that the most feasible compromise is the
use of the merit plan for the appointment of judges to the New York
Court of Appeals only. 2 Any further attempts to alter the present
elective system would be submitted, by way of local referendums,
to the voters of each county or city.27 Although certainly workable,
preferable. Judge Jacob Fuchsberg, in a 1975 interview concerning possible judicial reforms,
stated:
"I believe candidates should be screened by a preliminary vote of the entire Bar,
not by some small select committee in a particular jurisdiction when the judge is
being selected .

. .

. The ultimate popular vote ought to be limited to selection

from a small number who survive that process. The general election should be
without a party endorsement ....
Glasser, Fuchsberg:Smooth Shift from Advocate to Judge, 173 N.Y.L.J. 27, Feb. 7, 1975, at
1, col. 4.
" The Select Task Force on Court Reorganization, chaired by Senator Bernard Gordon,
a Republican from Peekskill, New York, is composed of members of the state legislature,
lawyers, judges, and law school professors. The Select Task Force held hearings early in 1976
with a view toward reform of methods of selecting judges. 175 N.Y.L.J. 34, Feb. 20, 1976, at
1, col. 2.
21 Gordon, JudicialReform: A Legislative Viewpoint, 48 N.Y. ST. B.J. 284, 287 (1976).
This conclusion is in accord with a plan currently before the state legislature which provides
for gubernatorial selection of court of appeals judges. See Gordon, Legislative View of a Better
JudicialSystem, 177 N.Y.L.J. 42, Mar. 3, 1977, at 1, col. 2. The proposal is the result of
compromise. Before Governor Carey assumed office in 1975, he appointed a Task Force on
Judicial Selection and Court Reform, headed by Cyrus Vance, to formulate proposals on
judicial reorganization. See 173 N.Y.L.J. 36, Feb. 24, 1975, at 1, col. 3. Some 15 months later,
the Task Force recommended merit appointment of all New York State judges by the Governor with the consent of the Senate. 175 N.Y.L.J. 86, May 4, 1976, at 1, col. 2. In a politically
pragmatic move, the Governor agreed to limit gubernatorial appointive powers to judges of
the court of appeals. Nonetheless, the section of the amendment dealing with appointment
of court of appeals judges was withdrawn when the amendment was passed for the second
time in the state senate. See N.Y. LEG. REc. S 1792C, at S 186, 200th Sess. (1977).
Gordon, JudicialReform: A Legislative Viewpoint, 48 N.Y. ST. B.J. 284, 286-87 (1976).
See also 175 N.Y.L.J. 12, Jan. 19, 1976, at 1, col. 4.
Senator Gordon proposed a "local option" plan for lower court judges. Under this proposal voters in each judicial district would decide if the judges in that district should be
appointed or elected to the bench. Id.
In contrast, the Dominick Commission advocated continued election of court of appeals
judges. See PHILp, Nez-mLSKi & PREss, supra note 5, at 104. Evidently, Judge Breitel does not
agree with the concept of "local option" and local differences in our judicial system. In
November 1976 he wrote:
Those who defend the status quo contend that the state's diversity requires regionalism in its courts and that it is "democracy" for the people to vote directly for their
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this compromise does not appear to deal adequately with several
aspects of the judicial selection problem.
For one thing, if there is any judicial office in which the public
appears to have continued interest, it is the court of appeals. After
the heated 1973 primary between now Judge Jacob Fuchsberg and
Federal District Court Judge Jack Weinstein, and the ensuing
pitched election campaign between Judge Fuchsberg and now Chief
Judge Charles Breitel, a public opinion poll indicated that seventythree percent of those surveyed felt that they "would have more
confidence in the Chief Judge" if he were elected, and preferred the
elective system for that position. 28 Less than eight percent favored
gubernatorial appointment of the court of appeals chief judge. Similarly, in 1974, the public indicated active interest in the election of
the associate judges to the court of appeals.29 Thus, the Gordon
proposal seems to be not only a very limited solution, but also one
which attacks the problem in the judiciary from the wrong end.
What is needed is a more basic and far-reaching compromise; one
that will increase the quality of judges in all our courts. Mandatory
screening is such a reform and appears to be workable and truly
responsive to the problem.
As was noted previously, mandatory screening of judicial candidates prior to nomination is gaining wider acceptance among proponents of both appointment and election. For example, the assistant
judges. The fact is that this regionalism produces the disorganized and inefficient
pattern that must be one, although not the only, reason the courts strain under an
impossible case load. As for the democratic selection of judges it is a delusion often
hypocritically foisted on the gullible. It is a political commonplace that with rare
and always notable exceptions the selection and advancement of judges is handled
by political leaders largely only for political purposes. The people vote but only to
ratify the choices made for them ....
Breitel, The New JudicialAmendment, County Lawyers' Ass'n, Vesey Street Letter 3 (Nov.
1976).
' PiLIp, NEJELSKI & PRESS, supra note 5, at 105.
Id. at 120. Interestingly, of those who voted in the 1973 general elections but did not
vote in the judicial election, 72% gave as their reason that they "didn't know enough about
the candidates." Only 18% said they "didn't care that much" who won or lost. Id. at 102.
31 See note 4 supra. In the words of one academician:
Perhaps any method of judicial selection has drawbacks. Election of judges,
whether on a nonpartisan or "retention-in-office" ballot, is accomplished by an
electorate largely unfamiliar with the candidate and his qualifications. ...
Perhaps what is most needed in judicial selection is examination in public of
a potential judge's qualifications and background. . . . Properly utilized, the process proposed should eliminate doubts as to a nominee's qualifications and resolve
possible conflicts of interest . ...
Lilly, Some Thoughts for JudicialReform in Oklahoma, 10 TULSA L.J. 91, 102 (1974).
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director of the American Judicature Society, an open supporter of
merit selection, wrote in early 1976: "The key to the success of [the
merit plan] is the judicial nominating commission. At least theoretically, the nominating commission goes through a rigorous screening
process for each of the judicial applicants."3 Similarly, Justice
Frank D. O'Connor of the appellate division, second department, an
outspoken advocate of our present elective system, recently stated:
[W]hat needs to be done is not to precipitously scrap a procedure
that has in the main worked remarkably well for the past 130 years;
that, with diligence and intelligence, every effort be made to improve that procedure; that bipartisan endorsements be barred for
judicial candidates except when running for reelection; that mandatory screening committees be established to evaluate candidates
prior to designation;that judicial elections, especially for superior
courts, be kept separate and apart from general elections; that we
embark upon a badly-needed high intensity educational program
amongst the electorate and that we encourage young gifted Americans, lawyers and non-lawyers alike, to enter the public arena.2
More important than its relatively new popularity, mandatory
screening provides an effective means of ensuring the competence
of judges at both the trial and appellate levels. Detailed examina-

tion of the qualifications of those who will be judges strikes at the
very heart of the present problems in the judiciary." Such screening
offers a mechanism for generating pertinent facts about the candidates or designees, and thus enables the public or the executive to
reach a decision in a well-informed manner. Additionally, when
screening is mandatory, it appears more likely that those who nomiAlfini, JudicialSelection: Take Your Choice, TRAL, Jan. 1976, at 11, 22.
O'Connor, An Argument for the Election of Judges, 175 N.Y.L.J. 29, Feb. 11, 1976, at
2, col. 3 (emphasis added). The increased recognition of the desirability of preselection screening indicates that a proposal for a mandatory rather than a voluntary plan would have a
realistic possibility of adoption. The distinction between voluntary and mandatory screening
is what the leaders in the state senate cited as the primary cause of their unwillingness to
support the 1970 Hansen-Duryea judicial reform bill. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1970, at 32,
col. 8.
31A Presidential Commission wrote in 1967:
The quality of the judiciary in large measure determines the quality of justice. It
is the judge who tries disputed cases and who supervises and reviews negotiated
dispositions .... Through the exercise of his administrative power over his court
he determines its efficiency, fairness, and effectiveness. No procedural or administrative reforms will help the courts, and no reorganizational plan will avail unless
the judges have the highest qualifications, are fully trained and competent, and
have high standards of performance.
THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocmWr 146 (1967).
31
31
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nate or appoint will not select or support unqualified candidates.
Admittedly, preselection screening will be neither a panacea
nor a flawless solution. Proper tests must be designed to assess the
candidates' competence and qualifications. Likewise, the screening
panel itself must be established, rules governing its composition and
procedures adopted, and some means of assuring impartiality and
diligence devised. The problem of who will screen the screeners
must be overcome. With careful drafting of the legislation creating
the panels and public scrutiny of the panels' activities and performance, these obstacles can be surmounted and an effective, intelligent, and fair screening format developed. Surely, the difficulty of
anticipating precise standards and developing a litmus test for judicial competence is not a ground for not attempting to do so at all.34
Of particular note in comparing the mandatory screening program to the Gordon proposal is the fact that the screening program
will apply not only to appellate judges but also to virtually all lower
court judges. 5 Under the New York Constitution, all appellate division justices are former supreme court justices,36 and, as a practical
matter, almost all of the judges on the court of appeals are former
trial judges. The trial judge is the judicial officer with the most
frequent and direct contact with the public. In any litigation, he
performs the most powerful role in the judiciary's factfinding process and is responsible for the initial application of legal principles
to the facts. Of necessity, he bears the primary duty to assess credibility and resolve conflicting evidence. 7 The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice emphasized that "the trial judge exerts a far greater influence on the
quality of justice" than his appellate brethren." Thus, it is extremely important that preselection screening take place at the trial
as well as the appellate level.
The statute proposed by this Article would do that, and would
also enable the screening groups to develop a working file on trial
11Edmund Burke once said: "There is nothing in the world really beneficial that does
not lie within the reach of an informed understanding and a well directed pursuit." E. BURKE,
Speech Before the House of Commons on the Plan for Economic Reform, February 11, 1780,
in BURKE'S POLITICS 176, 210 (R. Hoffman & P. Levack ed. 1949).
Curiously, in Missouri, which was the first state to adopt the merit plan, the plan still
applies statewide only to appellate courts. In several other states also, merit selection applies
to some, but not all, of the courts. See Atkins, supra note 5, at 204.
N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
" For a discussion of the importance of the trial judge's role, see Seiler, supra note 1, at
734-37; JudicialSelection in New York, supra note 1, at 608-09.
11TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS, supra note 5, at 65.
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judges prior to their ascension to higher courts. Through the adoption of this statewide proposal, the prospect of each court dispensing
justice of uniformly high quality should be greatly enhanced. The
achievement of this goal, which is fully consistent with our constitutional scheme, should, in turn, discourage forum shopping and help
build public respect for our entire judicial system.
In short, mandatory preselection screening appears to be a compromise that is not only politically viable, but one that also should
effect very significant improvements in the method of selection, the
quality of our judges, and the public's confidence in the courts. It
can alleviate, if not remove, some of the pro-appointment advocates' criticisms of our present system without necessitating a major
upheaval in the selection process. At the same time, companion
screening by civic bodies and bar associations can continue, local
referendums on the election-appointment controversy can still be
held, and other constructive changes in the selection process may
be developed. Through the adoption of mandatory preselection
screening the entire elective system may be significantly improved
while the larger controversy continues to rage.
FORMAT AND OPERATION OF A STATUTE FOR MANDATORY PRESELECTION
SCREENING

A number of plans for creation of a mandatory preselection
screening panel have been drawn, including specific statutes which
have been unsuccessfully proposed to the New York State Legislature.3 9 One of these proposals" will be used here as a model for
discussion. The full text of the proposal which would add a new
article 2-B to the Judiciary Law is set forth in the appendix to this
Article.
" See, e.g., N.Y.A. 3195 A, 193d Sess. (1970). Numerous other bills are proposed every
year to effect a constitutional amendment instituting merit selection of all judges via gubernatorial appointment from a list of nominees proposed by local commissions. For example,
in the 1975 session, the following bill was introduced: N.Y.A. 1102, 198th Sess. (1975). In 1976,
N.Y.S. 8696, N.Y.S. 9046, N.Y.S. 9046A, N.Y.S. 9046B, N.Y.S. 9047, N.Y.S. 9047A, N.Y.S.
9047B, N.Y.S. 9047C, N.Y.A. 12769, N.Y.A. 12771, N.Y.A. 13027, N.Y.S. 7402, N.Y.S. 7587,
N.Y.A. 9591, N.Y.S. 7607, and N.Y.A. 9593, 199th Sess. (1976) were introduced.
"' See N.Y.A. 8934, N.Y.S. 6772, 199th Sess. (1976). The statute proposed in the appendix of this Article [hereinafter cited as Proposed Statute] was based upon this proposed
legislation, which was submitted in the 1974-75 and 1975-76 legislative sessions. That proposed legislation was drafted by the author at the request of the Select Task Force following
testimony by the author at hearings before the Select Task Force in January of 1975. A similar
statute, also drafted in part by the author, was unsuccessfully submitted to the City Council
of the City of New York in 1976 by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
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Concept of the Statute
The principal features of the mandatory screening statute are:
(1) the creation of impartial local screening committees4' which will
conduct detailed studies of each candidate's or designee's qualifications for office;4" (2) the delineation of those characteristics believed
to promise high quality in the judiciary;43 (3) the publication of the
committee's decision and underlying rationale with respect to each
investigation;4 4 and, most importantly, (4) the requirement that no
person may become a judge unless found qualified by the appropriate screening commitee15
Although these ideals may be easily stated, their implementation presents difficulties. Preventing a breakdown at the level of
selection to the screening committee will be the real key to the
successful operation of the proposed program." Accordingly, the
statute regulates the general composition of the screening committees,4" grants them a certain amount of discretion in prescribing
their own rules,48 and provides a mechanism for removal of incompetent, dishonest, or nonfunctioning members of the committees.49
Nothing in the statute prohibits the political parties, or any
other civic or bar group from also screening potential judges. Indeed,
such additional screening should be encouraged so as to give private
interest groups the opportunity to reach their own conclusions and
thus present a public "check and balance" on the official screening
committees.5 0 The more review and information generated before a
judge is selected, the better off the public and anyone else making
the selection will be.
By the same token, the nonofficial screeners can also aid the
official panels in controlling other strong interest groups which may
be involved in the selection process. For example, such additional
screening might counter the somewhat exaggerated criticism by proelectionists of the current role of bar associations in the selection
process. For example, one recent commentator has opined:
4' Proposed Statute §§ 46-b to 46-f.
' Id. § § 46-g to 46-h.
Id. § 46-g.
Id. § 46-h(3).
's Id. § 46-a.
" See, e.g., VanOsdol, Politics and JudicialSelection, 28 ALA. LAw. 167, 173 (1967).
,7 Proposed Statute § 46-f.
Id. § 46-h(7).
Id. § 46-j.
so See, e.g., Desmond, 'Merit Selection' Isn't Easy Answer to Choose Judges, 173
N.Y.L.J. 15, Jan. 22, 1975, at 34, col. 3.
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In close judicial elections the public and the press often look to the
bar associations as neutral sources of information and guidance. A
bar association will, however, occasionally take an unusually
strong position in a judicial contest. Although a stated preference
is certainly ethical, it raises some vexing questions about the power
of the bar. Most disturbing is the fact that such endorsements tend
to come very late in a race, thereby severely limiting the opportunity for rebuttal. In any event, these endorsements stand virtually
uncontradicted since there is no organization with the authority or
reputation of the bar to counterbalance, much less rebut, the latter's more energetic advocacies. It is important that those who
specialize in the law pass on their knowledge of the judiciary to the
electorate, but unfortunately there is sometimes a thin line to be
drawn between the offering of neutral opinions and voter manipulation. 1
The unofficial screening may also assist the panels in guaranteeing
that political leaders not be kingmakers but rather act to improve
the quality of the bench.2
Perhaps the most important effect of additional screening will
be an increase in the amount of public data on each judicial candidate. Even after the heated public debate over the 1973 election for
chief judge of the court of appeals, according to an Institute of
Judicial Administration study, forty-nine percent of those polled
who knew of the race stated that they wanted more information.53
11JudicialSelection in the States, supranote 1, at 288. Actually, the various bar associations frequently disagree on candidates, see N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1974, at 27, col. 1. In fact,
one commentator concluded that the 1973 and 1974 court of appeals elections demonstrated
that "[t]he influence of the organized bar in judicial contests is at best marginal .... For
better or for worse, the public does not readily accept guidance from lawyers about judges."
McKay, Forword to Pinp, NEJ-LS1 & PRESs, supra note 5, at iii.
52 Many political leaders insist that they do not have control over judicial nominations
and that their actions are prompted by a desire to benefit the public. But see E. COSTIKYAN,
BEHMND CLOsED DooRs 201-10 (1966); Spaeth, supra note 1, at 15-16. It would certainly be
unfair to contend that all politicians do not sincerely believe that they exercise their power
in the public interest. Unfortunately, the actions of political leaders often speak louder than
their words. This writer participated in bar association screening of judicial candidates before
the 1976 election. During the screening candidates openly professed that they were nominated
for certain judicial offices simply because their local party leaders had determined that they
were electable. One of those candidates bluntly described the basis for his selection by the
party leaders as follows: "Let's face it. We're all political hacks." Another interesting example
occurs when New York City Civil Court judges are tapped by the leaders for promotion to
the supreme court. The political leaders, hoping to avoid primary fights for the seats of those
judges, have had them resign their posts before their terms expired but after the dates for
filing primary ballot petitions elapsed, thus assuring the leaders unfettered power to designate their successors. See generally N.Y. Times, Sept. 8,1975, at 30, col. 1 (editorial).
Pup,
l3
NFJELSI & PRss, supra note 5, at 96.
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Seventy-two percent of those who had not voted attributed their
decision not to vote to a lack of knowledge about the candidates. 5'
These complaints may be substantially, if not entirely, alleviated by
both requiring official preselection screening and encouraging nonofficial but responsible screening by civic and political organizations.
Mandatory Nature of Screening
The force of the program is supplied in the statute's opening
section, which requires a certification of "qualified" from the appropriate screening committee prior to the appointment or election of
any judge to any court other than a town or village court.5 Experience has shown that for preselection screening to be effective, it
must be mandatory. Otherwise, the committee's findings may be
and, in fact, have been disregarded when they conflict with the
wishes of the political parties.
The primary reason for the exclusion of village and town courts
is the belief that the screening process could become too cumbersome, costly, and localized if it sought to review this level of the
judiciary. Additionally, it appears possible to stimulate public involvement and instill knowledge regarding the candidates for such
local offices without an overseeing and information-gathering
57

body.

The Judicial Screening Committees
The proposed legislation would create separate judicial screenId. at 103.
Proposed Statute § 46-a.
5, The 1968 election for newly created supreme court vacancies in New York and Bronx
counties is particularly illustrative. After a series of meetings with City Bar Association
members, county leaders of both parties agreed to support only those nominees certified as
qualified by a blue-ribbon panel chaired by former Presiding Justice Bernard Botein. The
pact, however, was broken by the Bronx Democratic county leader when he nominated four
candidates who had been refused certification by the Botein committee. All four were elected.
M. TOLCHIN & S. TOLCHIN, To THE VICTOR. . . POLITICAL PATRONAGE FRoM THE CLUBHOUSE TO
THE WHrrE HousE 133-35 (1971).
"

7

As already observed, one of the primary problems with our current selection methods

is the failure to generate sufficient information about judicial candidates so that the public
can make an informed choice. See Spaeth, supra note 1, at 11; Note, How Much Do Voters
Know or Care About Judicial Candidates?, 38 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 141 (1955). Also, in some
recent polls, a substantial segment of the public has indicated that the failure to provide such
information is one of the main reasons for their lack of interest in judicial elections. See, e.g.,
note 29 supra.

1977]

MANDATORY PRESELECTION SCREENING

ing committees for each of the eleven judicial districts of the state58
and each department of the appellate division,59 and one committee
for the court of appeals and the court of claims." Basically, this
scheme seeks to provide a local body to oversee the nominees and
designees in each major judicial locality and separate, more broadly
based committees to deal with those courts which encompass more
than one judicial district. In view of the infrequent elections or
appointments to the court of appeals, the screening body for that
court would also screen designees for the court of claims.
Considering the number of positions each committee should be
able to handle,"1 this geographic formulation, based on the organizational scheme of the courts themselves, seems most practical. It also
appears sensible to have those doing the screening represent the
same constituency that the judges themselves will serve. Under such
a system each committee would appear more likely to understand
and respond to the interests of the locality involved.
The committees for the judicial districts would each consist of
fifteen persons, who would serve 5-year terms staggered to expire at
the rate of three committee members per year." A member could
not be reappointed after serving a term on the committee. In this
manner, some of the personnel on the committees would change
annually, but a greater number would remain. Thus, each committee would gain fresh insights while the continuity necessary to ensure knowledgeable functioning and proper orientation of new members would be maintained. 3 Appointments to the committee would
Proposed Statute §§ 46-b to 46-c.
5' Id. § 46-d.
eo Id. § 46-e. Virtually all of the judicial reform bills currently before the legislature,
particularly those calling for merit selection, propose similar geographic delineation for nominating and screening committees. See bills listed in note 39 supra. The 1970 Hansen-Duryea
bill, see notes 19-21 and accompanying text supra, also followed this approach, as does the
voluntary merit plan instituted by Governor Hugh Carey, see Exec. Order No. 5, 9A
N.Y.C.R.R. § 3.5 (1975), discussed in note 109 infra.
1, The number of supreme court judgeships a committee will be responsible for varies
with each district and department. The following indicates the number of judges authorized
in each judicial district: First-61; Second-38; Third-14; Fourth-13; Fifth-16; Sixth-9;
Seventh-16; Eighth-22; Ninth-21; Tenth-38; Eleventh-33. N.Y. JuD. LAW § 140-a
(McKinney 1976). There are seven permanent appellate division judgeships authorized for
the first department and second department, and five each in the third and fourth departments. N.Y. CONST. art VI, § 4(b).
The committee for the court of appeals and court of claims will have to screen candidates
for the seven justices of the court of appeals, as well as for the seventeen permanent court of
claims judges. See N.Y. CT. CL. ACr § 2(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977).
62 Proposed Statute § 46-c(1), c(5).
It is generally recognized that staggering the terms of the judges on a particular court
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be made alternately by the chief judge of the court of appeals, the
presiding justice of the appellate division department encompassing
that judicial district, and the administrative judge of the supreme
court for that judicial district. 4 The judicial screening committees
for the four appellate division departments would each consist of ten
members, 5 also serving staggered 5-year terms,66 with alternate
selections to be made by the chief judge of the court of appeals and
the presiding justice of the appellate division involved." Finally,
candidates or nominees for positions on the court of appeals and
court of claims would be screened by a committee consisting of ten
persons, 6 four of whom would be selected by the chief judge of the
court of appeals, four of whom would be chosen by the presiding
justices of the appellate division departments, and two of whom
would be appointed by the governor. 9 Their terms would also be
five years with two positions becoming vacant every year. 0
Obviously, no selection process is perfect. Nevertheless, the
statute attempts to use the method which appears most likely to
result in blue-ribbon committees.7 1 Essentially, this process is intended to entrust the selection of a large proportion of each committee to the chief judicial official or officials responsible for the areas
involved, with the governor having a role in the choice of members
for the state-wide committee. Since the presiding and administrative justices are charged with maintaining the efficiency of the principal courts affected by this proposal, they have a direct interest in
ensuring that the justices are highly qualified.72 The governor is
is advantageous. See Lowe, Merit Selection in the Equality State, 59 JUDICATURE 328, 334-35
(1976). Employing the same system in the context of the nominating committees should
achieve similar desirable results.
:4 Proposed Statute § 46-c(2).
Id. § 46-d(1).
Id. § 46-d(5).
6, Id. § 46-d(2).
Id. § 46-e(1).
IId.

, Id. § 46-e(5).
" "Blue Ribbon" does not mean elitist. As Dean Niles explained:
I would not like to see a commission in New York select candidates only from a
social or professional elite, but I do not think there is any chance of this happening.
So long as the executive officer is an elected official, I do not believe that there is
much danger in this day and age of any ethnic or religious minority being neglected.
Changing Politics, supra note 1, at 257.
72 In this respect, the proposed statute differs from most of the present merit plan proposals, see note 39 supra, and from Governor Carey's voluntary merit plan, see note 109 infra,
which, perhaps as a pragmatic concession to the political leaders, give the current majority
and minority party leaders of the senate and assembly a major role in selecting members of
judicial nominating committees. See also Spaeth, supra note 1, at 19-20.
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answerable directly to the people, and unlike state or local legislators or party leaders, his selections should be subject to sufficient
public scrutiny to induce him to act in a bona fide manner.13 Nonetheless, one cannot be naive about the possibility that politics might
be a factor in these selections. 7' Consequently, the proposal states
that a majority of the committeemen cannot be registered members
of any one political party.75 Additionally, it provides that the screening committee members cannot simultaneously hold any judicial or
other public or formal political office.7 6 These facets of the statute
should significantly minimize the deleterious effect politics can
have on the selection of the committees' personnel.
Makeup of JudicialScreening Committees
Each member of a judicial screening committee must be
"selected so as to assure that [the committee] is politically nonpartisan and . . . representative . . . . ,,77
In particular, the statute
explicitly stipulates the maximum number of persons of each political party who may serve on any one committee, mandates that forty
percent of the members of each committee be lay persons, and guarantees that both men and women will be appointed. 7 Thus, the

11

Twenty-one of the twenty-three states which have judicial screening or nominating
committees provide for selection of at least some committee members by the governor.
JudicialSelection in the States, supranote 1, at 326-41. It must be recognized, however, that
when a governor chooses committee members, the process may still be "subject to political
rivalries." Id. at 303. When one considers the desirability of removing the entire selection
process from the political sphere, Governor Carey's decision to give the majority and minority
leaders of the senate and assembly a voice in choosing committee members, see Exec. Order
No. 5, 9A N.Y.C.R.R. § 3.5(3) (1975), is indeed of questionable wisdom.
1,Even if the selections are politically motivated, the use of screening committees rather
than nominating committees should decrease the effect of politics in the actual work of the
screening group. One recognized authority on the subject explained regarding nominating
committees:
The most politically-minded governor cannot ignore for long the attitudes of the
bar and the judiciary towards his appointments to the bench. Nor can the most
professionally-oriented lawyer or judicial member of the nominating commission
consistently disregard the political acceptability of the various candidates to the
governor.
Watson, Judging the Judges, in SELECTED READINGS ON JUDiCAL SELECTION AND TENURE 62 (G.

Winters ed. 1974). This observation would not necessarily apply to the operations of screening
committees since, unlike the nominating committees, it would not be the duty of the screening committees to propose judicial candidates. Their only function would be to review the
qualifications of candidates presented to them. See also R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, THE
POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND THE BAR (1969).
'1 Proposed Statute § 46-f(1).
"

Id. § 46-f(2).
Id. § 46-f(1).

79Id.
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proposed screening program draws on the arguments of the proelectionists who insist that members of the judiciary reflect the
people's wishes.7 9 Each committee, as a representative of the public,
must be truly responsive to the community it serves. The broad
requirement that these committees be politically nonpartisan and
the specific qualifications on the power of appointment are an attempt to ensure that responsiveness.
The limitation on the number of positions held by each political
party is intended to prevent the domination of any committee by a
strong partisan organization." This limitation should serve to focus
the committee's attention on each candidate's professional qualifications, which are the only legitimate subject of inquiry, and minimize any consideration of the candidate's political connections.
Aside from this restriction, the statute attempts to attack the
representation problem in a positive manner by guaranteeing membership to a cross section of the community. The proposal's emphasis is not on satisfying established quotas; the use of quotas to
achieve representation of individual racial and ethnic groups is, at
best, of questionable effectiveness. It is submitted that the appointment of unprejudiced and community-oriented members is far more
significant than the assignment of an arbitrary number of positions
to selected groups. Religious and geographic representation also
seems more likely to be achieved through careful individual appointments. Nevertheless, the public apparently does not entirely
agree with this view, and, perhaps more importantly, there is no
perfect test of one's being sincerely unprejudiced and responsive.
The surest way to obtain such qualities, or at least their appearance,
on the committees is to require diversity and broad representation
to be built into the membership structure itself. At the same time,
however, flexibility must be maintained. For example, numerical
representation of all groups in a community the size of any of the
boroughs in New York City would result in a large and unwieldy
committee. Consequently, the statute requires that a cross section
of the area involved be represented, but only "to the extent reasonably feasible." 8'
This limitation on the duty to provide broad representation
does not apply to the requirement that at least some of the members
11See,

e.g., Atkins, supra note 5, at 207.

See Proposed Statute § 46-f(1).
, Id. Some flexibility here appears necessary so that the various committees reflect the
great differences in ethnic and racial balance in different areas of the state. Such differences
also exist within the judicial departments and districts.
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be women." The number of women in law schools, in the bar, and
on the bench is steadily increasing, and, of course, women constitute
more than fifty percent of the populace. This readily identifiable
is entitled to a direct and major role in the
and large group clearly
3
judicial process.1

Perhaps the most controversial aspect of this section in the
proposed statute is the requirement that a significant portion of the
membership be laymen.8 4 It has been suggested that lay members
on such a screening group are often unduly influenced by both the
lawyers on the committee and those persons who have appointed
them. 15 The more prevalent view, however, is that the active participation of lay members makes the committee more reflective of the
attitudes of the community and contributes an important human
element to the screening process. As one commentator has recently
written:
Those who criticize the participation of lay membership fail to
realize that the mere presence of such individuals creates a confidence in the commission's actions and motives. In addition, the
public voice in such selections cloaks the commission with an aura
of public trust. 8
A 1973 report on screening state judges under the Massachusetts merit plan 7 summarized the contributions and effects of lay
membership as follows:
The interaction between lawyers and laymen on the Committee is
of some interest. Except in one or two cases, most of the laymen
had scant knowledge of the courts, the judiciary, or their recent
problems. The laymen, however, soon realized that they were as
perceptive as the lawyers about people, and equally adept in evaluatifig available information. While the laymen had to defer to lawyer opinions about legal experience, they held strong, independent
12 Proposed Statute § 46-f(1).

No specific standards are fixed for the number of women, see id., but it is assumed
that mere tokenism will not characterize the role of women on the screening committees.
84 Id.

See, e.g., Changing Politics, supra note 1, at 249-50.

JudicialSelection in New York, supra note 1, at 630.
The Massachusetts plan involved a voluntary merit plan adopted by former Governor
Francis W. Sargent in 1972. The plan was adopted to assist the Governor in appointing judges
to fill vacancies created by a constitutional amendment which required state judges to retire
at age 70. See Robertson & Gordon, Merit Screeningof Judges in Massachusetts:The Experience of an Ad Hoc Committee, 58 MAss. L.Q. 131 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Robertson &
Gordon].
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views and were by no means dominated or manipulated by the
lawyers.
Lawyer perceptions of the lay members confirm the capacity
and desirability of lay participation. Most felt that lay people provided a more detached view of the system, bringing a consumer
citizen perspective to bear, and counteracting the "chuminess"
that tends to exist among lawyers.8
In addition to these qualifications on the composition of the
committees, the statute addresses itself to the propriety of the individual member's political and governmental activities. In order to
preserve the autonomy of the screening group members may not,
during their tenure, "hold any elected or appointed public office or
office in any political . . . organization .
"8...
,9 Since the party
leaders will undoubtedly continue to designate and nominate most
of the judicial candidates, elimination of these same leaders from
the official screening process appears essential to the maintenance
of the independence of the judicial screening committees. 0
For similar reasons, the statute further provides that a person
can be a member of only one judicial screening committee at a
time." This limitation is designed to prevent any one person or
small coterie of persons from amassing too much power in the judicial selection process. It should also prevent the overburdening of
committee members and secure for each court the full attention of
all members of the appropriate committee. Like their counterparts
in most other states, the committee members, as opposed to the
committees' staffs, will not be paid for their services. 2 Thus, their
screening duties, which will be somewhat sporadic and cyclical,
11Id. at 138. See also Winters, One-Man JudicialSelection, 45 J. AM. Jun. Soc'Y 198,
201-02 (1962). A recent study of the composition of judicial nominating commissions in
various states further illustrates the contributions laymen make to a screening program. See
A. ASHMAN & J. ALFINI, THE KEY TO JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: THE NOMINATING PROCESS 3839 (1974).
81Proposed Statute § 46-f(2).
,0Many cases have emphasized that persons sitting in capacities analogous to judges
must not only be impartial, but must also appear to be impartial. See, e.g., Commonwealth
Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968). This same quality should
also be required of those who would screen potential judges.
" Proposed Statute § 46-f(3).
32 Id. § 46-f(5). Most states with screening committees do not pay the members. See, e.g.,
Robertson & Gordon, supra note 87, at 145. See also Wakeland, A Nonlawyer on a Judicial
Discipline Commission, 59 JUDICATURE 468 (1976). Other current judicial reform proposals

also do not provide for compensation for nominating or screening committee members but
do allow for reimbursement of their expenses. See, e.g., N.Y.A. 1102 § 38(g), 198th Sess.
(1975). Similarly, Governor Carey's voluntary merit plan only allows reimbursement of expenses. Exec. Order No. 5, 9A N.Y.C.R.R. § 3.5(5) (1975).
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usually intensifying just prior to election day, will have to compete
with their other commitments, obligations, and interests. Limiting
members to one committee at a time should enable them to give
adequate attention to their screening responsibilities.
Finally, all committee members must reside in New York State
and live or, in the case of practicing attorneys, maintain their principal law office in the geographic area covered by the screening
committee upon which they sit. 3 If the committee is to be responsive to the community it represents, it must have extensive firsthand knowledge of the characteristics of that community. Residence
or law practice therein are neither a sine qua non nor a guarantee
of such knowledge, but they are traits which should make such
knowledge and community understanding more likely. The nonresident attorney provision seeks to acknowledge the reality that many
lawyers commute to work from adjacent counties. The committee
should not be denied the 'extensive experience and familiarity with
the courts which a lawyer gains through active practice in a particular locale. Those selecting the committee members, however, should
carefully examine the nonresident attorney's knowledge of local affairs in an effort to ascertain the extent to which his law practice
has attuned him to the peculiar needs and interests of the community.
Several merit plan statutes would also prohibit members of the
nominating and screening committees from seeking or being appointed to judicial office for some specified period after serving on
a committee. 4 Where the committees actually propose and recommend a list of nominees to the governor, such a prohibition is
deemed advisable to prevent the committee members from simply
annointing each other. 5 Since the committees here will serve only
to screen candidates, such a prohibition does not appear necessary.
Furthermore, since detailed written public reports must be provided, 6 they should not be able to slip their members by the public.
12Proposed Statute § 46-f(4). This provision is not included in the other currently proposed judicial reform bills, see, e.g., N.Y.S. 7402, sec. 5, § 15-a(c)(3), 199th Sess. (1976) (only
city residents may be members of New York City nominating committees), and appears to
be novel. It is recommended in order to enable our urban areas to utilize practitioners who
are commuters. Such commuter practitioners have a direct interest in maintaining the quality of justice where they make their living as well as where they reside.
g, One of the more prominent examples of such a prohibition is contained in Governor
Carey's plan. See Exec. Order No. 5, 9A N.Y.C.R.R. § 3.5(5) (1975).
11See generally Judicial Selection in the States, supra note 1, at 308. Hopefully, the
committee members will be of such quality that they will not attempt to misuse their office
to gain a judgeship. Nonetheless, it will not hurt to be wary of the possibility.
11Proposed Statute § 46-h(3).
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If such backslapping and quasi-nepotism does develop, however, the
statute should be promptly amended to add such a prohibition.
Qualities the Committee Should Consider
The task of compiling a checklist of qualities or designing an
empirical formula which will result in the selection of only highly
competent judges is plainly impossible." Aside from the lack of
agreement over just what is and is not a "good judge," personality
and psychological factors must also be assessed." The difficulty of
fixing precise standards, however, is no justification for simply not
attempting to do so at all. It is certainly possible to develop a program which, like most other human endeavors, is not foolproof but
nonetheless is capable of improving the judiciary.
Clearly, there are some minimum qualifications that any litigator knows judges must have. Additional necessary attributes are
suggested by common sense and general experience in business and
personal relationships. The proposed judicial screening statute
draws on this knowledge and experience and indicates some such
minimum requirements. It provides that
the judicial screening committee shall consider, among other
things, the following characteristics of [each] candidate or nominee: legal ability and aptitude; ability to articulate verbally and
in writing; litigation and other professional experience and published writings in the practice, administration or teaching of law;
temperament and demeanor; industry and diligence; fairness and
impartiality; knowledge of and readiness to adhere to the code of
judicial conduct; honesty; freedom from conflict of interest; independence and decisiveness; integrity; moral and professional character; and physical and mental health. Without limiting the
groundsfor certifying or refusing to certify any candidate or nominee as "qualified". no candidate or nominee shall be certified as
"qualified" if he is found to be lacking in the foregoing categories
of qualifications."
" See, e.g., Rosenberg, The Qualitiesof Justices-Are They Strainable?,44 TEx. L. REv.
1063 (1966); TASK FORCE REPORT: THE CoumS, supra note 5, at 68.
"8 It has been suggested that the assessment of a candidate's personality and mental
stability should include the administration of a psychiatric examination. See Kuvin & Saxe,
Psychiatric Examination for Judges, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1975, § 4, at 13, col. 2. This
proposal was strongly criticized. See Letter to the Editor from Gerald Stern, Administrator
of the Temporary State Commission on Judicial Conduct, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1976, at 32,
col. 5. While such a proposal does appear unduly extreme, even Kafkaesque, the screening
process would clearly be incomplete without an examination of a judicial designee's psychological background and stability.
" Proposed Statute § 46-g (emphasis added).
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To begin with, one should emphasize the words "among other
things" and the prelude to the final sentence in this section. Both
of these phrases are designed to allow and encourage the judicial
screening committees to fashion standards they deem appropriate
and to determine the relative weight to be given the various factors
in each case. It should be noted, however, that the committee's
broad authority in this area is not unchecked. Committee findings
must be supported by a publicly reported written statement of reasons, '° and any member who is acting improperly may be removed.' 1 These two facets of the statute, together with the reasonable assumption that care and intelligence will be exercised in choosing each committeeperson, should prevent any screening group from
becoming a "runaway committee."
Nevertheless, it is not only fair, but essential that one ask:
What is the basis for the list of qualifications included in the
statute? The answer is that the list was developed not simply from
the common professional experience of lawyers and judges, but also
from the openly expressed sentiments and observations of the public.
Many of the qualities emerge from the 1972 Report of the Temporary Commission on the New York State Court System [the
Dominick Commission],"'2 which attempted to isolate the traits
contributing to judicial incapacity and misconduct. The commission examined improper conduct both on the bench, such as laziness, impatience, rudeness, and arbitrariness; and off the bench,
including political ties, immorality, concern for publicity, and neglect of judicial time and duties. It also considered general physical
and mental disabilities, such as lack of stamina, psychological or
drinking problems, physical infirmities, and mere indecisiveness.'"3
'10 Id. § 46-h(3).
Io, Id. § 46-j.
1022 TEMPORARY COMM'N ON THE NEW YORK COURT SYSTEM, REPORT 60-61 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as TEMPORARY COMM'N]. This commission is frequently referred to as the
Dominick Commission, after State Senator Clinton Dominick, its chairman. The commission
was created by the legislature in 1970, see ch. 943 [1970] N.Y. Laws 2893, after the HansenDuryea bill was defeated, see notes 19-21 and accompanying text supra, to propose revisions
in the court system. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1973, at 1, col. 1. Unfortunately, the report
advocated the retention of the present elective system, TEMPORARY COMM'N, supra, at 53-55,
and only suggested major changes in the disciplinary and removal procedures. Id. at 61-62.
This was a major blow to the reform movement. Nonetheless, it is significant that the report
also recommended abolition of the nominating convention, id. at 55, and the adoption of
preselection screening for appointedjudges, id. at 54. For a discussion of this report, see Klein
& Witztum, JudicialAdministration 1972-1973, in 1972-1973 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN

LAW 717, 718 (1973).

"3 TEMPORARY COMM'N, supra note 102, at 60-61.
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Several judges, including former Chief Judge Arthur Vanderbilt of the New Jersey Supreme Court, a recognized and respected
advocate of judicial reform, have detailed some of the qualities to
be sought. Twenty years ago Judge Vanderbilt listed the following
criteria: "learned in the law . . . as applied in action in the courtroom, . . . versed in the mysteries of human nature and- adept in
the discovery of the truth . . . beholden to no man, independent
and honest . ... "04 He concluded that "[s]uch ideal judges can
after a fashion make even an inadequate system of substantive law
achieve justice; on the other hand, judges who lack these qualifications will defeat the best system of substantive and procedural law
imaginable.' ' 0 5 Similar qualities were emphasized by 144 trial
judges who responded to a questionnaire of the National College of
State Trial Judges in 1965. The following characteristics, in order
of importance, were ranked as most crucial: moral courage, decisiveness, reputation for fairness and uprightness, patience, good health,
and consideration for others. ' "8
The public has also expressed its views on the indicia of judicial
competence. For example, in 1975, 230 lay volunteers, under the
direction of the League of Women Voters, monitored the activity in
various city, suburban, and rural Illinois courts for five months.
Their comments, as reported by the American Judicature Society,
are consistent with those of the judges and others grappling with the
problem. Some of their more revealing observations have been summarized as follows:
Judges who seemed easily angered or flippant or who tried to be
funny were disappointing to court watchers. Plainly, citizens want
and expect their judges to be father figures, dignified and sober.
In hundreds of reports, there was not one criticism of a judge for
being too stern, too firm or too serious. On the whole, judges were
rated highly for their patience, attentiveness and courtesy. But
sarcasm, flippancy, weakness or intemperance when they did appear were not highly regarded, nor was too much informality
107

Lawyers and learned commentators have also contributed their
'o

A. VANDERBILT, THE CHALLENGE OF LAw REFORM

12 (1955), quoted in Seiler, supra note

1, at 744.
105A. VANDERBILT, THE CHALLENGE OF LAW REFORM

12 (1955).

10,Rosenberg, The Qualities of Justices-Are They Strainable?, 44 Tzx. L. REv. 1063,
1066-67 (1966).
-' Fenoglio, Citizens Size Up Their Judges, 59 JUDICATURE 472, 476 (1976).
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opinions on the subject.' 8 Recently, a member of one of Governor
Carey's nominating committees' 09 outlined the various traits examined by the committee he serves on." ' In order of importance, they
are: intelligence, industry, integrity, judgment, and judicial temperament."' Similar qualities were emphasized by the New York
City Mayor's Advisory Committee on Judicial Selection established
by Mayor Robert Wagner in 1962 when he instituted voluntary
merit selection for the New York City criminal and family courts."'
In a 1966 article, Professor Maurice Rosenberg, a former member of the Mayor's committee, listed personal qualities and characteristics, preparatory education and training, professional attainments and special experience, and political, ethnic, and other affiliations as the four general areas which that committee had exam11 See notes 110-28 infra. See also VanOsdol, Politics and Judicial Selection, 28 ALA.
LAW. 167, 174 (1967); Note, JudicialSelection and Tenure-The Merit Plan in Ohio, 42 U.
CiN. L. RFv. 255, 277 (1973).
' Executive Order No. 5, 9A N.Y.C.R.R. § 3.5(2)-(4) (1975), provided for the establishment of five nominating committees: a statewide committee which considers candidates for
the court of appeals and court of claims, and one for each judicial department to consider
gubernatorial designees to the courts within that department. The appropriate committee
may not recommend an individual absent a finding by a majority of the committee's full
membership that such individual is well qualified. Id.
,MO
Rubin, JudicialScreening by Governor's Committee, 176 N.Y.L.J. 18, July 27, 1976,
at 5, col. 2. Mr. Rubin reported that the committee for the appellate division, second department seeks the following qualifications:
Most important, in our opinion is intelligence. The person who is bright has a
capacity for learning and scholarship which is more important than experience.
Secondly, the candidate should have industry, a concern to make effective use of
his time, the time of the court and the time of the litigants. Third, he must have
integrity, the ability to be fair and impartial. Without integrity, no system ofjustice
can function. Next, he must have judgment which will manifest itself in acts of
compassion and common sense. Finally, he should have judicial temperament, the
capacity for patience, dignity, humility and understanding. The absence of any of
these qualifications makes impossible a conclusion of "well-qualified." The presence of all assures a judicial candidate in which all can have confidence and pride.
Id.
'" Id. Governor Carey's enabling order listed only these criteria: "character, temperaExec. Order No. 5, 1, 9A N.Y.C.R.R.
ment, and professional aptitude and experience ....
§ 3.5(1) (1975).
"I These judges are appointed by the mayor. The mayor is guided in his selection of
family court judges by the New York Family Court Act which spells out the criteria for
eligibility: "In making. . . appointments, the mayor. . . shall select persons who are especially qualified for the court's work by reason of their character, personality, tact, patience
and common sense." N.Y. F~Am. CT. Acr § 124 (McKinney 1976).
Although the work of Mayor Wagner's Committee on the Judiciary terminated at the
expiration of Mayor Wagner's term in December 1965, see Rosenberg, The Qualitiesof Justices-Are They Strainable?, 44 Tx. L. Rav. 1063, 1074 (1966), both Mayor Lindsay and
Mayor Beame have appointed committees to assist them in judicial selection, see Judicial
Selection in New York, supra note 1, at 626 n.107.
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ined." 3 Under the first of these items, the committee probed the
candidate's character, patience, humility, tolerance, zeal and capacity for work, common sense, and tact."4 The second encompassed not only education and years at the bar, but also "teaching,
lecturing, or writing." ' 5 Interestingly, although trial and courtroom
experience was also considered, the committee "was explicit in declaring that trial experience is not a sine qua non for appointment,
but only a 'plus factor.""'" In the area of attainments and experience, the committee stressed civic and bar association activities
and, surprisingly, political activity, which it viewed as "a mark in
the prospect's favor.""' 7 As Professor Rosenberg observed, political
activity is a factor which the state trial judges who responded to the
National College of State Trial Judges questionnaire listed as the
least important quality contributing to judicial competence."1 With
respect to the last category, the committee reviewed the candidate's
political and ethnic affiliations in recognition of the need to achieve
balanced and broad representation of all groups on the bench."'
Such a need is indeed a factor in the selection process, but it is not
a pertinent criteria in determining whether a particular judge is
"qualified" to hold office.
The areas examined by the Mayor's committee are generally
accepted as appropriate indicia of a candidate's suitability to hold
judicial office. Disagreement arises, however, when these criteria are
sought to be applied. The current debate centers on how to define
these qualities, how to determine whether they are truly possessed,
"I Rosenberg, The Qualities of Justices-Are They Strainable?, 44 Tsx. L. REv. 1063,
1075-77 (1966). Substantially the same qualities were considered by the Nassau and Queens
County Bar Association screening committees. See Buckley, The "NassauPlan"forSelection
of Better Judges, 34 N.Y. ST. B. J. 345, 346 (1962); Hentel, The "Queens Plan" for Selection
of Better Judges, 34 N.Y. ST. B.J. 23, 24 (1962).
"I Rosenberg, The Qualities of Justices-Are They Strainable?, 44 TEx. L. REv. 1063,

1075-76 (1966).
"' Id. at 1076.

H Id. Others agree on this assessment. See, e.g., TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS, supra
note 5, at 68; COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL COURTS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF
NEW YORK, THE QUALIFICATIONS OF A U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE EASTERN OR SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF N.Y. 3 (July 23, 1974). According to a member of one of Governor Carey's current

screening panels, "experience as a trial lawyer, while desirable, is distinctly of secondary
interest." Rubin, JudicialScreening by Governor's Committee, 176 N.Y.L.J. 18, July 27,
1976, at 5, col. 2. For a contrasting opinion, see Kelner, The QualifiedJudge: His Component
Parts, 173 N.Y.L.J. 48, Mar. 12, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
"I Rosenberg, The Qualities of Justices-Are They Strainable?, 44 Tax. L. REv. 1063,
1077 (1966).
" Id. at 1068-69.
",

Id. at 1076-77.
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and what relative importance to ascribe to them in the evaluation
of a particular judicial designee. The disagreement that exists between the judges and the Mayor's committee regarding the value of
political activity is merely one illustration. The differences of opinion are often less clearly defined. For instance, one experienced trial
lawyer recently commented: "In our courts many superb judges
have had no prior major courtroom experience before mounting the
Bench. It may fairly be said of them, to their credit, that they
became fine judges in spite of, and not because of their inexperience
in trials and appeals."' 10 While no one would dispute the usefulness
of trial and appellate experience, serious disagreement exists concerning the quantity and the type of experience that is most helpful.
How does one define "major courtroom experience?" How does one
rate a lawyer who has tried a number of one-day or two-day trials,
but never an extended trial? What rating should be given to a trial
lawyer who has spent virtually his entire day in court but has rarely,
if ever, engaged in legal writing? What consideration should be
given to the fact that a lawyer may have tried cases or argued
appeals only in a limited number of the sundry areas of the law?
These questions and others like them have led many learned practitioners and commentators to emphasize that although some courtroom or appellate experience is necessary, its importance will vary
with each case. 2 '
Like the evaluation of trial experience, the screening program
itself will be conducted to a large extent on an ad hoc basis since
the process cannot be reduced to fixed formulas and provable theorems. Limited but firsthand experience in bar association screening
persuades this writer that those involved in the screening process
must thoroughly review all the factors each situation presents. Perhaps the best expression of the practical difficulty involved in
screening judicial candidates is William James' oft-cited statement
that "[t]here is very little difference between one man and another; but what little there is is very important."' 2
The proposed statute attempts to identify those fundamental
character and personality traits which are commonly recognized as
essential to the successful fulfillment of judicial duties. These include, among others, temperament and demeanor, industry and
'12 Kelner, The Qualified Judge: His Component Parts,173 N.Y.L.J. 48, Mar. 12, 1975,
at 3, col. 1.
"I See note 116 supra.

in B. SHIENTAG, THE PERSONALITY OF THE JUDGE 3 (1944), quoted in Rosenberg, The
Qualities of Justices-Are They Strainable?, 44 TEx. L. REV. 1063, 1080 (1966).
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diligence, and fairness and impartiality.!2 In addition, the statute
strives to ensure that each candidate possesses the requisite ability.
Thus, "legal ability and aptitude," "ability to articulate verbally
and in writing," and "litigation and other professional experience
and published writings in the practice, administration or teaching
of law" are all stressed in the proposed enactment.'14
The importance of these traits is readily apparent. The ability
to articulate ideas clearly, both forensically and in written opinions,
is an absolute necessity if a judge is to perform his duties effectively.
Today's crowded dockets and ever-increasing litigation demand
that our judges be able to work under constant time pressure without sacrificing justice. 12 The statute, through the requirement of
diligence and industry, seeks to satisfy this public need and procure
judges who are both hard working and adept at reaching well reasoned, thorough decisions in a short period of time. Finally, implicit
in the minimum qualities prescribed by the statute is freedom from
not only the fact but also the appearance of bias or lack of high
professional and personal character. 216 If the public is to have faith
in its judiciary, it must not have any doubts about the impartiality
and honesty of those on the bench.
The presence or absence of such qualities in any one candidate
should become evident after a thorough examination of the designee's background. Interviews with judges, lawyers, and even former
clients when feasible, who have observed or worked with the candidate in his professional capacity, should be particularly valuable
sources of information. In assessing the candidate's writing ability,
the committee should seek to review samples of his written work. If
personal conferences with the candidate are conducted, as they certainly should be, forensic and legal ability can be tested further by,
at the very least, posing detailed and specific questions on the law.'2
'2 It must be recognized, however, that, as the President's Commission found: "These
factors are illustrative of the type of criteria which a nominating [or screening] commission
should consider. But no way has been found to give a uniform meaning to [such] imprecise
terms ....
" TASK FORCE REPORT: THE CouRTs, supra note 5, at 68.
"I Proposed Statute § 46-g.
"2 See Botein, Judges and Their Critics: A Need for Understanding,169 N.Y.L.J. 17,
Jan. 24, 1973, at 1, col. 3; Rosenberg, Improving Selection of Judges on Merit, 56 JUDICATURE
240, 241 (1973).
I" Judicial impartialty and high professional and personal character are qualities which
have been frequently stressed in judicial opinions. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Chandler, 354
F.2d 655, 656 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966); Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d
806, 812 (3d Cir. 1965). See also note 90 supra; Stem, The State's Commission System of
Judging Judges, 173 N.Y.L.J. 89, May 8, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
121Heavy emphasis should be placed on one's understanding of and ability to articulate

MANDATORY PRESELECTION SCREENING

1977]

Some advocates of in-depth screening recommend that the judicial designees be required to submit to a written test. 28 Such tests
are given in many civil law countries, where the judges are actually
trained in college for their position and constitute almost a branch
of the civil service.12 1 In contrast, the American judiciary draws on
distinguished and experienced lawyers. The administration of a bartype examination in our system would appear to be both demeaning
and unnecessary. This is not to say that the committee cannot require the candidates to submit written answers to the committee's
written questions. Such a procedure is expressly permitted and is
contemplated by the statute. 3 ' But this written questionnaire
should not take the form of a bar or school examination. While it
might test legal expertise and knowledge of court procedures to
some extent, the questions generally should be more informational
in nature.
The term "litigation" rather than merely "trial" experience
was purposely used in the statute with respect to the screening
group's review of the candidate's professional experience. 3' The
applicant should have participated as lead or co-cotinsel in some
trials, including at least a few that have gone through to final judgment. Knowledge of the broader aspects of the litigation process,
however, such as pleading, motion practice, pretrial discovery procedures, settlements, and appeals, in many instances would appear
to be far more important than the amount of trial time logged. A
judge must do more than rule on objections; he must charge juries
and often render rulings on the merits of the case and on pretrial
and trial motions. To a great extent, litigation experience gained
through activity outside of the courtroom can be of greater assistance to a judge performing these functions than time actually spent
in court.

32

the law clearly. This may be discernible from a discussion of legal issues and the candidate's
legal philosophy at interviews, as well as from his published writings and other contributions
to the development of the law.
121 At least one of the current proposed constitutional amendments, N.Y.A. 1102, § 39(b),
198th Sess. (1975), would require that a "state judicial merit exam" be taken and passed by
all prospective judges.
"I2See Alexander, The Selection and Education of the Judiciary-Some Unfinished
Tasks, 40 PENN. B.Q. 57, 64-65 (1968); Richert, Recruiting and TrainingJudges in France,
57 JuDIcATuaE 144 (1973); Scott, The Selection of Federal Judges, 24 WAsH. & LEE L. REv.
205, 216-22 (1967); Seiler, supra note 1, at 739-41.
'
Proposed Statute § 46-h(4).
9

See id. § 46-g.

See note 116 and accompanying text supra. Generally, a lawyer's qualifications for a
judicial position may be questioned when he has not been actively involved in the litigation
2
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Other professional experience and writings, either as a practicing attorney or teacher of law should also be given serious consideration, so long as it was related to the litigative process. The qualifications of Federal District Judge Jack Weinstein are illustrative. A
professor of law at Columbia prior to his appointment, Judge Weinstein authored or coauthored many articles'33 on a variety of legal
issues as well as a multivolume treatise on civil procedure. 34 Since
his appointment he has coauthored a multivolume treatise on the
Federal Rules of Evidence.13 5 With such credentials, even without
consideration of any trial experience he may have had, it would be
difficult indeed to raise any question concerning his legal ability to
hold judicial office. Judge Weinstein is perhaps an extreme example. The point, however, is that nonlitigative aspects of one's legal
career may also evidence an attorney's competence to hold a judgeship. 3' The proposed judicial screening committees would have the
latitude to weigh all aspects of the candidate's legal career, not
merely trial experience, in determining whether a prospective nominee or appointee is "qualified" to be on the bench.
Proceduresfor the JudicialScreening Committees
The proposed statute provides a basic time schedule'37 and
some skeletal procedures for the screening process but leaves to each
committee the formulation of more detailed "fair and reasonable
procedures" which may be adopted by a majority vote.'38 This local
rulemaking power varies from the provisions of several other proposed screening or merit plans in which a statewide unit, such as
process. Of course, there are obvious exceptions to this general rule of thumb. See notes 13336 and accompanying text infra.
"' E.g., Weinstein, Some Difficulties in Devising Rules for Determining Truth in Judicial Trials, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1966); Weinstein, JudicialNotice and the Duty to Disclose
Adverse Information, 51 IOWA L. REv. 807 (1966); Weinstein, Trends in Civil Practice, 62
COLUM. L. REV. 1431 (1962); Weinstein, Recognition in the United States of the Privilegesof
Another Jurisdiction,56 COLUM. L. REV. 535 (1956).
' J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A. MILLEa, NEW YoRK CIVIL PRACTICE (1969).
- J. WEiNsTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE (1975).
"' There have been, of course, many other judges from academic backgrounds and other
careers outside of private litigation practice who have excelled on the bench-Supreme Court
Justices Felix Frankfurter, William 0. Douglas, and Hugo Black, to name but a few. It seems
proper, however, to conclude that these will usually be the exception to the rule. The committees should usually look for and weigh heavily one's having had recent experience in the
crucible of actual litigation.
7 Proposed Statute § 46-h(3).
" Id. § 46-h(7). For a description of some basic procedures see, Hunter, The Judicial
Nomination Commission, 52 JUDICATURE 370 (1969). One of the first procedures likely to be
performed is the selection of a chairperson for the committee.

1977]

MANDATORY PRESELECTION SCREENING

the committee for the court of appeals under the proposed statute,
would be directed to promulgate rules for all other committees."'9
Local variations in rules, however, appear to be advisable in New
York, since many of the judicial districts and departments differ to
a large extent in their population, number of judges, court congestion, and geographic size. Notwithstanding this need for flexibility,
the legislature will be well advised to monitor the differences in local
procedures so that it may act quickly in the event the local rulemaking authority proves counterproductive.
The statute also gives each committee the power to subpoena
testimony and papers "reasonably related to the inquiries currently
before it."'' Reimbursement for expenses incurred by witnesses is
authorized to the same extent as that provided under the New York
Civil Practice Law and Rules.'41 The committee subpoenas would be
subject to judicial review and entitled to judicial enforcement under
the pertinent provisions of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.'42 The
subpoena authority appears necessary to assure that the screening
groups are able to compile the requisite facts upon which their determinations should be based. At the same time, it is recognized
that there exists a danger that this authority might be abused.
Thus, judicial supervision is desirable to prevent both the flaunting
of the committees' demands for appropriate information and the
enforcement of unjustified subpoenas for material or testimony not
reasonably relevant to the inquiry at hand. While the committees
obviously are not intended to be Star Chambers, they must have the
power to obtain pertinent information and, if necessary, to compel
those in possession of this information to produce it.
Under the proposal, each candidate or nominee must submit to
the committee's screening process at least 45 days prior to the election or appointment date.'43 Upon refusal or failure to cooperate, the
committee may decline to certify him for judicial office.' 44 The
See Exec. Order No. 5, 9A N.Y.C.R.R. § 3.5(2) (1975).
Proposed Statute § 46-h(8). This provision is also contained in other reform proposals.
See, e.g., N.Y.S. 7072, § 38(f), 197th Sess. (1974).
' See N.Y. Clv. PRAc. LAw § 2303 (McKinney 1974).
242 Proposed Statute § 46-h(8). See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw §§ 2301-2310 (McKinney 1974).
For a delineation of the appropriate standards for judicial review, see New York Comm'n on
Gov't Operations v. Manhattan Water Works, Inc., 10 App. Div. 2d 306, 199 N.Y.S.2d 120
(1st Dep't 1960); In re Sun-Ray Cloak Co., 256 App. Div. 620, 624-25, 11 N.Y.S.2d 202, 20607 (1st Dep't 1939). See also Premium Serv. Corp. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 511 F.2d 225
(9th Cir. 1975); Horizons Titanium Corp. v. Norton Co., 290 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1961); United
States v. IBM, 62 F.R.D. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
10 Proposed Statute § 46-h(1).
'3'
"0
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screening process may involve any of the committee's properly
adopted procedures, including a written questionnaire and personal
interview, as well as those procedures specified by the statute. At
least 15 days before the election or appointment date, the committee must issue a written report stating its conclusion and the reasons
for its decision.' 45 This decision need not be unanimous. A majority
vote will suffice, but the votes of each member must be included in
the written report so as to make the degree of agreement within the
committee a matter of record. 4 ' Additionally, any committee member may add a concurrring or dissenting opinion, which will be
published with the report.'47
There are two reasons underlying the requirement that the report be in writing and published. First, the decision and rationale
when circulated, will provide the general public with pertinent information regarding the qualifications of the candidates. Second,
dissemination of the report will reveal the nature and bases for the
committee's decision so that it can be "tested" in the crucible of
public opinion and compared with the conclusions of others who
know or screen the designee. One of the principal purposes of the
screening process is the compilation of detailed information regarding potential judges so that those selecting them, either the electorate or the executive, will be able to make an informed and intelligent choice.' 48 What the committee has learned, together with the
conclusions and rationale of the majority, concurring, and dissenting members, can be of invaluable assistance in the final election
or appointment decision.' Thus, the statute contemplates a de' Id. § 46-h(2).
,,5 Id. § 46-h(3).
1,6Id. § 46-h(6). While Governor Carey's voluntary merit plan only requires a majority
vote, see Exec. Order No. 5, 9A N.Y.C.R.R. § 3.5(1) (1975), the committee for the second
department demands a vote of seven of eleven, or eight of thirteen members for approval of
a candidate. See Rubin, JudicialScreening by Governor's Committee, 176 N.Y.L.J. 18, July
27, 1976, at 5, col. 2.
"' Proposed Statute § 46-h(3).
"' See, e.g., Robertson & Gordon, supra note 87, at 135.
" The public's general ignorance concerning judicial candidates and the offices they
seek to fill is well recognized. As a recent commentator correctly observed:
The advantages which the public has been led to expect from judicial electioneering
are greatly restricted by the ethical regulations of both the bar and the courts.
Indeed, unless a candidate has been guilty of some gross professional or judicial
abuse, there are very few issues which may be openly aired for the benefit of the
voting public. Judicial campaigns are therefore principally ceremonial with minimal give and take between prospective judges and their electorate.
Judicial Selection in the States, supra note 1, at 290-91 (footnotes omitted). The official
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tailed and discursive report by the judicial screening committees,
not merely a cryptic, generalized, and conclusory statement. A committee's certification should not end the screening process or be
merely rubber-stamped by the public, the Governor, or the mayor.
Instead, these officials or the electorate should further analyze the
committee's decision. This analysis will only be possible if a thorough opinion prepared by the screening group is available.
Likewise, when the committee enters a decision not to certify
a judicial candidate as qualified, both the candidate and the public
are entitled to a complete explanation. By requiring that the report
be detailed and that it be made public at least 15 days before the
ultimate selection,15 the statute seeks to afford the designee a
meaningful opportunity to muster support for and seek reconsideration of the matter. This is not to suggest that reconsideration should
be readily granted. Nonetheless, the committees will not be infallible; when reconsideration is plainly warranted, it should not be
refused. In view of the potentially serious detrimental effects of
refusal to certify, reconsideration, while sparingly utilized, should
always be available. A thorough published report hopefully will either justify the committee's decision or provide a basis for review
when that decision is improper.
In this regard, the committees should seriously consider adopting procedures whereby a candidate or nominee is advised of the
committee's decision prior to its release. Upon notification the designee may withdraw from the election or from consideration for
appointment and thus moot the report and have it tabled. Such a
procedure would be a humane way to handle a refusal to certify
since it would minimize any future difficulties the disqualified judicial designee might encounter. As a result, any reluctance on the
part of committee members to withhold certification should be reduced, and more lawyers should be willing to submit to the screening process.1 51 On the other hand, it can be argued that a truly
qualified candidate has nothing to fear from the screening process
and there is no harm in discouraging marginal candidates from
submitting themselves for such an important post.15 Due to their
reporting of the screening panel's conclusions and disagreements will provide an appropriate
forum in which the more subtle differences between candidates may be discussed.
11 Proposed Statute § 46-h(3).
"I See generally Garwood, Democracy and the Popular Election of Judges: An

Argument, 16 Sw. L. REV. 216, 234 (1962); Lowe, Merit Selection in the Equality State, 59
JuolcATURE 328, 332 (1976); REPORT OF THE SPECAL COMMrrrEE, supra note 2, at 8.
2 The pro-electionists similarly argue that persons with nothing to hide should have
nothing to fear from the elective process. See Desmond, 'Merit Selection' Isn't Easy Answer
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speculative nature, these conflicting policy arguments cannot be
easily resolved at this time. Hence, the proposed statute leaves this
matter to the individual committee to consider. If such a procedure
is eventually adopted, it appears advisable for the committee's report to be prepared but filed under seal. Future committees would
then have access to it in the event the designee resubmits his name
for judicial office.15
Another important procedural matter which the proposed statute leaves to the discretion of the committees is whether their proceedings other than final reports should be kept confidential. It has
been argued that "the members of the commission cannot effectively perform their functions unless they can speak candidly ....
[S]omething may be said about some candidate that is not wholly
' But the problem
complimentary." 54
is not that simple. One of the
major aims of this program is the education of the public so that it
will be better able to evaluate the proposed judges. This goal is
clearly furthered by the increased amount of information which
would be disclosed by public hearings on each candidate's judicial
qualifications. Moreover, excessive secrecy can breed suspicion. As
one commentator, albeit in a slightly different context, has observed:
Confidentiality is a two-edged sword. Too often, as Edmund Burke
reminds us, "Where mystery begins justice ends." The most stringent set of ethical standards are of little consequence unless the
public is convinced that the standards are uniformly and vigorously enforced. The interplay between the need for credibility and
the need for confidentiality is one of those problems of balancing
conflicting interests with which all lawyers and judges are famil155
iar.
to Choose Judges, 173 N.Y.L.J. 15, Jan. 22, 1975, at 25, col. 4; Desmond, 6 Good Judges-An
Argument in Support of Elective Process, 171 N.Y.L.J. 17, Jan. 24, 1974, at 25, col. 1;
O'Connor, An Argument for the Election of Judges, 175 N.Y.L.J. 29, Feb. 11, 1976, at 1, col.
2. At any rate the screening process should pose much less of a threat of unfairly maligning
an honest and decent candidate.
I" If this process is attempted, careful steps will have to be taken to ensure that the letter
as well as the spirit of such "under seal" procedures are honored. Too many incidents of grand
jury leaks have occurred in recent times. In order to maintain their public integrity, the
screening committees must not allow their procedures to breed similar breaches of confidentiality.
" D. KELLEY, COLORADO'S MErr SELECION PLAN 7 (1969).
'' Greenberg, The Task of Judging the Judges, 59 JUDIcATURE 458, 463 (1976). An incisive
summary of the confidentiality dilemma and how it has been handled under some of the
current merit systems was provided in a recent article advocating the adoption of a merit
system for Florida:
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Governor Carey's voluntary merit plan provides: "Except as
may be necessary for the preparation of such reports, all information
submitted to the committee shall. . . not be disclosed except to the
Governor, unless required in connection with the performance of
official duties or disciplinary proceedings."' 5 8 This limitation would
have to be removed in elective situations. The committees' public
reports should be detailed and complete if the public is to get the
benefit of the committees' screening activities. The information in
them should also be kept available for use by other or future screening committees.
There is obvious merit to the argument that confidentiality will
aid the screening committees in gathering sufficient information to
make an informed decision. At the same time, confidentiality may
result in compromising other goals of the screening program. It appears advisable, therefore, tb leave to the committees the task of
striking the proper balance between these competing interests.'5 7
A major concern of those designing merit systems is the problem of balancing the
need for public scrutiny of the commissions' proceedings against the need to keep
certain of the commissions' investigation confidential. All nominating commissions
strike this balance in favor of maintaining strict confidentiality concerning most
information received on a candidate. The purpose of maintaining this confidentiality is to allow the commissions to work without overt public pressure that might
impair their objectivity. Moreover, it appears reasonable for nominees to expect
that their file will not be placed in the public domain and thus not make it distrustful for well qualified lawyers to have themselves available for judicial posts. Obviously, this is a different problem than that of making information concerning the
actual nominees available to the public. There is considerable variation, however,
among the states on the extent of confidentiality. Only three states-Alabama,
Alaska, and Tennessee-require the commissions to release the names of all candidates under review. Missouri leaves this decision to the commission's discretion.
Eleven states require that all nominees be made public, whereas Ohio, Colorado,
and New York City, by contrast, require that only the name of the appointee be
made public.
Atkins, supra note 5, at 207.
The New York City plan referred to is the Mayor's voluntary merit system for the
criminal and family courts. See Rosenberg, The Qualitiesof Justices-Are They Strainable?,
44 Tnx. L. REv. 1063, 1073-77 (1966).
v Exec. Order No. 5, 1, 9A N.Y.C.R.R. § 3.5(1) (1975).
"
See Robertson & Gordon, supranote 87, at 146; JudicialSelection in the States, supra
note 1, at 307. Apparently the recently enacted "sunshine" law, N.Y. Pus. OFF. LAw §§ 90-

101 (McKinney 1976), will not require that the committees' deliberations be open to the
public. Since the committees are examining qualifications for office, their meetings should
fall within the provisions permitting discussions relating to employment and appointment to
be held in executive session. Id. § 95(1)(a). Governor Carey's plan mandates that all information received by the nominating committee be kept confidential and disclosed only to the
governor. Exec. Order No. 5, 9A N.Y.C.R.R. § 3.5(1) (1975). Committee meetings held pursuant to this plan should also qualify for treatment under the executive session exception.
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The actual experience of the committees will give them the practical
understanding of the problem necessary to construct a solution.
Staffing and Funding
The proposed statute directs the legislature, the executive department, the chief judge, the Office of Court Administration, and
their staffs to promptly take the steps "necessary to adequately staff
and fund each of the judicial screening committees" so as to enable
them "to undertake and competently perform [their] functions"
under the statute. 5 No specific timetable or budget is prescribed,
but the intent of the statute is that within a year after enactment
the committees should be in operation and provided with at least a
full-time administrative and secretarial staff and part-time investigative assistance."'
The statute's directive to aid the committees is addressed only
to those officials and public bodies whose assistance appears indispensable. Hopefully, those unnamed officials and others, particularly the political leaders, whose cooperation would also assist the
screening panel in operating effectively, will join in the effort rather
than attempt to thwart implementation of the statutory scheme.
Those charged with the responsibility of funding and staffing should
do everything in their power to encourage full cooperation and to
prevent frustration of the preselection screening program.
Removal and Discipline of Committee Members
There is no sure remedy for misconduct or incompetence on the
part of committee members, any more than there is for the same
problem in the judiciary.' 0 The committee itself by a two-thirds
' Proposed Statute § 46-i.

Other screening plans also provide for salaried administrative and investigative staffs.
See, e.g., Judicial Selection in New York, supra note 1, at 633; Judicial Selection in the
States, supra note 1, at 307-08.
"I Judicial incompetency is difficult to predict and often equally as difficult to detect
and eradicate after a person becomes a judge. As a recent commentator has explained:
The fundamental problem is this: a judge exercises more power with less accountability than any other official in our society. This is true whether he is elected or
appointed for life. The number of incompetent judges disposed of at the ballot box
may well be less than the number of competent judges so dispatched. A recognition
of the judges' lack of accountability does not constitute an indictment of either
judges or the legal system, but it does mean that effective and competent judges
are essential to the administration of justice in our society.
Patterson, Should Lawyers Judge the Judges?, 59 JUDICATURE 457 (1976). For an informative
"'

summary of the workings of the New York State Temporary Commission on Judicial Con-
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vote, or failing action by it, the appointing officials, if unanimous,
have the authority under the proposed statute to remove a member
who is "lacking in fairness, moral character, honesty, impartiality,
diligence or responsibility." '' Hopefully, such drastic action will not
be necessary; if it is, however, it must be taken lest the committee's
functions and ideals be jeopardized by the indiscretions of its members.
The disciplinary provisions are general in nature and are not
intended to be exclusive. More specific delineation of the conduct
expected of committee members must await enactment of the program. Upon implementation, the committees may utilize their rulemaking power to decree disciplinary regulations. As always, care
must be exercised to avoid the abuse of this power, since it conceivably could turn the committees into autocratic and inflexible bodies.
Notably, however, the statute adds the further final caveat that
nothing in it "shall be construed to limit in any way the procedures
otherwise set forth" for removal or other disciplinary action against
the committee's members as public officials of the state."2
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
The proposed statute is not drafted as, and does not direct, a
constitutional amendment, because it does not change the actual
selection method. Neither the person or persons responsible for the
selection nor the manner of that selection, be it election or appointment, are altered. Ultimately, the statute only seeks to create a
mechanism for ensuring that those selected, regardless of how or by
whom, are qualified to be judges. Nevertheless, the argument may
be made that the statute is invalid under both the United States
1 3
and New York Constitutions. 1
duct, see Stem, The State's Commission System of Judging Judges, 173 N.Y.L.J. 89, May 8,
1975, at 1, col. 1.
M Proposed Statute § 46-j(1).
162
Id.

§ 46-j(2).

The Supreme Court historically viewed claimed abuses of state election procedures
as within the realm of political questions not properly determined by the federal courts. See
Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944). After the Court's decision in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962), a new era of federal concern over the fair implementation of state electoral
processes began. Since Baker the Court has acted to invalidate a wide variety of voting
regulations. See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974) (filing fees as exclusive method
of obtaining access to ballot invalidated as denying equal protection to indigents); Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (striking Tennessee's durational residency requirements for
voting); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (Virginia's poll tax declared
unconstitutional).
26
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At the outset of any analysis of possible federal constitutional
problems, it should be noted that the statutory scheme envisioned
by the preselection screening program differs markedly from those
candidacy and voting requirements with which the Supreme Court
has heretofore dealt.'64 In particular, the program's classification is
based upon each candidate's individual merit to hold office,' 5 not
an assessment of the candidate's relative popularity or his compliance with technical requirements such as payment of filing fees or
property ownership.' 6 ' Furthermore, the proposed statute would affect the selection of judges only. This particular office has retained
its enigmatic qualities, and the public has repeatedly acknowledged
that it lacks sufficient information to adequately examine and compare judicial candidates.' 7 Finally, mandatory preselection screening would apply equally to all nominees or designees for judicial
office; it cannot be contended that the program would discriminate
against minor party or independent candidates."' With these distinctive characteristics in mind, possible federal constitutional
challenges based on either due process or equal protection grounds
appear insubstantial." 9
"ISee, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (durational residency requirements); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (filing fees); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431
(1971) (nominating petition requirement); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970) (property
qualifications).
'1 Concurring in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), Justice Harlan implied that
classifications based on merit may be viewed more favorably than other restrictions. Speaking
in reference to the Electoral College, he remarked: "If a State declares that an entire class of
citizens is ineligible for the position of Elector, and that class is defined in a way in which
individual merit plays no part, it strikes at the very basis of the College ....
Id. at 44.
"I Many of the Supreme Court's right to candidacy decisions deal with restrictions which
tend to perpetuate the two-party system. Requirements for obtaining access to the ballot,
such as those for filing petitions or obtaining a certain percentage of the vote in prior elections,
militate against participation of minority parties or independent candidates in the political
process. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). These and other requirements are
typically designed to promote administrative efficiency and avoid voter confusion. See, e.g.,
Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974) (filing fees). For a survey of the litigation over candidacy
requirements, see Jardine, Ballot Access Rights: The ConstitutionalStatus of the Right to
Run for Office, 1974 UTAH L. Rav. 290, 317-31.
"I See notes 5, 53-54 and accompanying text supra.
16 Candidate restrictions are often challenged on equal protection grounds as being
discriminatory toward minority party and independent candidates. The Supreme Court has
been reluctant, however, to invalidate such restrictions when they are applied uniformly to
all candidates and do not have an inordinately discriminatory impact on independents or
minority candidates. See, e.g., American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974) (upholding plan
requiring all parties to demonstrate significant support to obtain ballot position); Storer v.
Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (finding constitutional a disaffiliation requirement applied to
party candidates and independents alike).
"I There is considerable uncertainty as to the outcome of most constitutional challenges
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Initially, it may be argued that the proposed statute constitutes
a denial of due proces by violating the right of association as guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments. 7 The right of association includes the right to join together in political parties for sharing
7
and advancing political ideas.Y1
A fundamental objective of such
association is the nomination and election of candidates for public
office.17 1 Consequently, a restriction on access to the ballot which
effectively precludes a candidate from running for public office may
be considered an invalid infringement of the right of association
unless counterbalanced by a compelling state interest. 73 Although
under the screening program some individuals will be excluded from
candidacy for judicial office, the only candidates excluded will be
those who are found to be incompetent and thus not qualified,' be
to voting or candidacy restrictions. As Justice White commented, in Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S.
724 (1974):
It is very unlikely that all or even a large portion of the state election laws would
fail to pass muster under our cases; and the rule fashioned by the Court to pass on
constitutional challenges to specific provisions of election laws provides no litmuspaper test for separating those restrictions that are valid from those that are invidious under the Equal Protection Clause. . . .Decision in this context, as in others,
is very much a "matter of degree," . . . very much a matter of "consider[ing] the
facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests which the State claims to be
protecting, and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classification."
. . .What the result of this process will be in any specific case may be very difficult
to predict with great assurance.
Id. at 730, quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) (citation omitted).
Io See La Clercq, The Emerging Federally Secured Right of Political Participation,8
IND. L. REv 607, 626-27 (1975) [hereinafter cited as LaClercq]; Developments in the
Law-Elections, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1111, 1134-36, 1176-77 (1975).
"I The right to associate in order to advance political beliefs was initially recognized in
a nonelection context. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). The first amendment
guarantee was first used to invalidate ballot restrictions in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23,
30-31 (1968). There, the Court, applying a strict scrutiny test, found that burdensome signature requirements were not justified by any compelling state interest. Of particular interest
is Justice Harlan's concurring opinion analyzing the first amendment issue. Id. at 41-48
(Harlan, J., concurring).
"I See Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58 (1973); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31

(1968).
"I See, e.g., Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1973). The due process standard of
review applied in Pontikes required the state to show that the restrictions both furthered a
legitimate interest and did not "unnecessarily restrict constitutionally protected liberty." Id.
"I In Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970), the Court refused to invalidate as void on
its face an intricate grand jury selection system which to a limited extent was similar to the
judicial screening program. The procedure involved a process of random selection with provision for elimination of those citizens found not to be "intelligent." Id. at 348-54. Although
the system granted officials a wide degree of discretion in excluding prospective jurors, the
Court did not find the scheme inherently unfair and thus invalid, remarking that the plan
was designed at least to result in the nondiscriminatory selection of "intelligent" jurors. Id.
at 355. Since the proposed preselection screening would be based on substantially more
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they major party, minor party, or independent candidates. The
state interest in maintaining a highly qualified judiciary is obvious
and compelling. Moreover, the current ineffectiveness, in terms of
educating the public and policing the judiciary,' of voluntary
screening in judicial elections demonstrates that mandatory screening is necessary to promote the state's concern in this area. In contrast to this clear interest, the right of political association appears
to be particularly weak in the context of judicial elections. As the
New York Court of Appeals has noted, the advancement of political
ideology is not a valid consideration in the election of judges. 78 To
the contrary, the court has explicitly espoused the goal of depoliticizing judicial selection in New York. 17 Thus, the rights of excluded
candidates appear minimal and the state's interest paramount.
It has been suggested that a screening statute may be subject
to an equal protection challenge since its effect would be to deny to
some the opportunity of holding judicial office.' 7 As noted previously, this classification does not disqualify minority candidates;
rather, it disqualifies those persons who are unfit to serve the public
as members of the judiciary. As a result, the statute, which is carefully delineated, would directly promote the state's interest in ensuring competent judges. At the same time, "the interests of those
who are disadvantaged by the classification,' ' 7 unqualified candiobjective criteria than the "intelligence" requirement of Turner, the case for the validity of
the judicial screening proposal is considerably stronger.
,' See, e.g., notes 5, 29 & 53-54 supra.
278 See Rosenthal v. Harwood, 35 N.Y. 2d 469, 323 N.E.2d 179, 363 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1974).
Judge Jones, writing for a unanimous court, remarked: "There can be no doubt that after
election a Judge has no partisan responsibility to any political party. On the contrary his
responsibility is to discharge the duties of his judicial office in total indifference to any prior
political affiliation." Id. at 475, 323 N.E.2d at 182, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 942.
I" Id. at 473-74, 323 N.E.2d at 182, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 941.
I's Although the precise origins of the right to be a candidate have not been clearly
delineated, it is generally agreed that the right stems from either the right to vote or the first
amendment right to associate. See La Clercq, supra note 170, at 625. Consequently, when
challenged on equal protection grounds, candidacy restrictions are subjected to a test of strict
scrutiny and must be justified by a compelling state interest. See, e.g., American Party v.
White, 415 U.S. 767, 781 (1974). Justice Harlan advocated review of candidacy requirements
as possible violations of due process, see Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 41-48 (1968)
(Harlan, J., concurring), but such requirements have more often been challenged on equal
protection grounds. See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Jenness v. Fortson, 403
U.S. 431 (1971). Recent decisions of the Supreme Court seem to have applied a somewhat
relaxed strict scrutiny standard in reviewing these equal protection challenges to candidacy
restrictions. See, e.g., American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 780-81 (1974); Storer v. Brown,
415 U.S. 724, 728-36 (1974). See generally Comment, A New Dimension to Equal Protection
and Access to the Ballot: American Party v. White and Storer v. Brown, 24 AM. U.L. Rv.
1293, 1299-1325 (1975).
,"I Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968). There, Justice Black delineated the
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dates or those desiring to vote for unqualified candidates, can at
best be termed questionable. Finally, the screening program must
be viewed as a response to the well-recognized difficulty in assessing
the judicial suitability of particular candidates. In this regard, it is
significant that the voters or the executive may still support persons
of their own choosing, provided only that such persons display the
ability necessary to fulfill the obligations of a judge. Representing
a needed safeguard against judicial incompetency, the screening
program furthers a compelling state interest while infringing only
minimally, if at all, upon an individual's right to run for office or
to vote for a candidate of his choice.
Assuming that the proposed screening statute survives a federal
constitutional challenge, its constitutionality may also be questioned under the New York State Constitution. In particular, it may
be argued that section 20 of article 6180 appears to bar implementation of the proposal. Section 20 authorizes the legislature to prescribe qualifications for judges of several enumerated courts. Noticeably absent from this list are most of the judicial offices which
would be covered by the proposed screening committees.",1 It has
been suggested that such exclusion effectively bars the legislature
from imposing restrictions on the election of judges who are not
specifically mentioned in section 20.182 This absence of explicit authorization, however, does not necessarily render the screening committee concept unconstitutional. The rules of constitutional interpretation indicate the course a favorably disposed court may follow
relevant considerations in assessing an equal protection challenge to a state's statutory restrictions on access to the ballot as follows: "the facts and circumstances behind the law, the
interests which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classification." Id. (footnote omitted).
"I N.Y. CONsT. art VI, § 20(c) states in pertinent part: "Qualifications for and restrictions upon the judges of district, town, village or city courts outside the city of New York,
other than such [minimum practice requirements] specifically set forth in subdivision a of
this section, shall be prescribed by the legislature ....
"
M Most conspicuous by their absence from § 20(c) are the court of appeals, appellate
divisions, supreme court, and the New York City civil and criminal courts.
I" See N.Y. Office of Court Administration, Memorandum from Michael Colodner to
Michael R. Juviler (March 7, 1975). The memorandum also suggested that the screening
committees are barred from any meaningful participation in the electoral process by the
requirement that judges for most courts of statewide jurisdiction be "chosen by the electors."
See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (court of appeals); id., § 6(c) (supreme court); id., § 13(a)
(family court). The "chosen by the electors" language seems ambiguous at best when interpreted as a proscription of electoral regulations. In light of such ambiguity, a legislative
enactment regulating selection of judges should not be declared unconstitutional unless it is
clearly erroneous to construe the legislature's power as encompassing the particular regulation. See N.Y. CONST., Constitutional Interpretation § 5 (McKinney 1969).
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in upholding the proposed statute's validity. Since the language of
article 6 is by no means conclusive, the applicable provisions should
83
be construed to effectuate the purpose of the judiciary article.
Considering the primary purpose of the article to be the establishment and maintenance of a competent judiciary, the goal of an
effective preselection screening program is in perfect accord with the
New York Constitution." 4 As Professor W. David Curtiss, a member
of the 1972 Dominick Commission, commented:
Clearly, if the effectiveness of judicial nominating commissions in
an elective setting is demonstrated, thereby establishing the relationship between their use and the objective of improving the quality of elected judges, it would constitute a strong argument that
the procedure did not represent an unconstitutional restraint upon
eligibility for elective office.'1
The courts, if presented with a constitutional challenge to the
proposed screening statute, should concentrate upon the screening
statute's purposes and likely effects.' The attempt to improve the
quality of the judiciary within the spirit of the state constitution
should not be misconstrued as a threat to the selection processes
prescribed by that constitution. Precious time would be lost if this
obviously nonpartisan and reasonable method for obtaining preselection assurance of judicial competence is summarily struck
See N.Y. CONST., Constitutional Interpretation § 1 (McKinney 1969), which provides:
It has been said that the constitution should receive a liberal construction, a broad
and not a petty construction, a rational, sensible and practical construction, and
must be construed from a common sense standpoint, and that a technical or
strained construction should be avoided. In short, the constitution should receive
a reasonable construction so as to effectuate, rather than to defeat, its purpose

'"

Id. (footnotes omitted).
I' In other states the call for depoliticizing the judiciary has already resulted in adoption
of selection plans in which nonpartisan nominating commissions play an integral role. See
Note, JudicialSelection in North Dakota-Is ConstitutionalRevision Necessary?, 48 N.D.L.
REv. 327, 328-30 (1972). The screening statute proposed in this Article is similar to those
plans, which have proven successful in focusing attention on the judiciary's professional
qualifications and away from their political affiliations. Although the "precedents are not
clear-cut," a favorable ruling on the constitutionality of the proposed screening commission
appears to be part of "the leadership the court must provide if the courts are to become less
politicized than they have been." Rosenthal v. Harwood, 35 N.Y.2d 469, 474, 323 N.E.2d 179,
182, 363 N.Y.S.2d 937, 941 (1974).
'I Curtiss, supra note 18, at 323.
,m See Jardine, Ballot Access Rights: The ConstitutionalStatus of the Right to Run for
Office, 1974 UTAH L. REv. 290 (1974), where it is suggested that a court faced with a constitutional challenge to a statute which imposes eligibility requirements on candidates should
adopt a "balancing of the real state interests involved against the ballot access rights asserted." Id. at 332.
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down. The statutory scheme is too reasonable and the need for
prompt steps to initiate judicial reform in New York too great and
too long overdue to warrant such a restrictive and wooden view of
the constitution.
Nevertheless, should a state constitutional challenge prove successful, the statute should then be promptly submitted to the people
as a constitutional amendment. The redrafting necessary to convert
the statute to an amendment would not be difficult and the end
result, although seriously delayed, will be at least as positive.
CONCLUSION

We must recognize that there is presently little practical chance
that a switch to merit selection of all judges will come to fruition.
Serious and sincere disagreement still exists over the advisability of
effecting such a sweeping change in our method of selecting state
judges.
It may be possible, however, to adopt a system of mandatory
preselection screening for all judicial candidates and nominees without changing the present system of selection. Such screening may
be able to assure, and will at least improve significantly the likelihood, that only persons who are qualified for judicial office actually
attain that position, regardless of whether they are elected or appointed. Such an assurance is the real core of the merit plan for
judicial reform and is fully consonant with the elective system. Even
the most vocal pro-election advocates recognize that preselection
screening would significantly improve our present system.
Everything possible should be done to take advantage of the
receptiveness which presently appears to exist among the politicians
and the interest which currently is being exhibited by the public for
the type of compromise judicial reform proposal here advocated:
mandatory preselection screening. This reform can improve the
quality of our judges now while we continue to debate the harder
questions of judicial reform, particularly the merit appointmentpartisan election controversy. Mandatory preselection screening is
a long overdue first step towards ensuring the high level of judicial
competence and quality which the public is entitled to expect and
have.
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APPENDIX

The following is the author's proposed statute to institute preselection screening in New
York.
The judiciary law is hereby amended by adding thereto a new article, to be article twoB, to read as follows:
ARTICLE 2-B
JUDICIAL PRE-SELECTION SCREENING OF JUDGES
Section 46-a. Mandatory pre-selection screening of all judges and justices.
46-b. Judicial screening committees.
46-c. Selection and composition of the judicial screening committees for the judicial districts.
46-d. Selection and composition of judicial screening committees for the appellate
division judicial departments.
46-e. Selection and composition of judicial screening committees for the court of
appeals.
46-f Nature of judicial screening committees.
46-g. Qualifications of candidates and nominees for judicial office.
46-h. Reports and procedures of the judicial screening committee.
46-i. Staffing and funding of judicial screening committees.
46-j. Removal.
§ 46-a. Mandatory pre-selection screening of all judges and justices. No judge or justice
of any court other than justices of any town or village court, shall be appointed, elected,
reappointed or reelected to such office unless and until such person shall have been certified
by a judicial screening committee for such court as "qualified" for such office as provided in
this article.
§ 46-b. Judicial screening committees. A separate judicial screening committee shall
be created, maintained, staffed and funded for each judicial district of the state to screen
prospective judicial nominees or appointees for all courts subject to pre-selection screening
as provided in section forty-six-a of this article sitting in such judicial district, except that
separate judicial screening committees shall be created, maintained, staffed and funded for
each appellate division of the supreme court and for the court of appeals of the state. The
judicial screening committee for the court of appeals shall also screen judges and prospective
judges of the court of claims of the state.
§ 46-c. Selection and composition of the judicial screening committees for the judicial
districts. 1. Each judicial screening committee for each judicial district of the state shall
consist of fifteen members, five of whom shall be selected by the chief judge of the court of
appeals, five of whom shall be selected by the presiding justice of the appellate division in
whose department the particular judicial district is located, and five of whom shall be selected
by the administrative justice of the supreme court for that particular judicial district.
2. Selections to the judicial screening committee for each judicial district shall be made
alternately by the three selecting officials as vacancies occur on the judicial screening committee for that district, with the chief judge of the court of appeals making the first such
selection, the presiding justice of the appellate division for that district making the next such
selection and the administrative justice of the supreme court for that district making the next
such selection.
3. Interim vacancies on the judicial screening committee of each judicial district shall
be filled in the manner prescribed in subdivision two of this section, with the chief judge of
the court of appeals selecting a member to fill the first vacancy, the presiding justice of the
appellate division for that district selecting a member to the next vacancy (not necessarily
in the same year), and the administrative justice of the supreme court for that district
selecting a member to fill the next vacancy (not necessarily in the same year).
4. In making each selection to the judicial screening committee for each judicial district, the selecting official shall attempt to satisfy the requirements of forty-six-f of this article
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in the light of the then present make-up of the judicial screening committee for that judicial
district.
5. Each member of each judicial screening committee for each judicial district shall be
selected to serve a single term of five years, except that the initial selections to the judicial
screening committee shall include three persons selected to serve for five years, three persons
selected to serve for only four years, three persons selected to serve for only three years, three
persons selected to serve for only two years and three persons selected to serve for only one
year; so that thereafter the terms of three members shall expire each year.
§ 46-d. Selection and composition of judicial screening committees for the appellate
division judicial departments. 1. Each judicial screening committee for each judicial department of the appellate division of the supreme court shall consist of ten persons, five of whom
shall be selected by the chief judge of the court of appeals and five of whom shall be selected
by the then presiding justice of the appellate division for that judicial department.
2. Selections to the judicial screening committee for each appellate division judicial
department shall be made alternately by the two selecting officials as vacancies occur on the
judicial screening committee for that judicial department with the chief judge of the court of
appeals making the first such selection and the presiding justice of the appellate division for
that judicial department making the next such selection.
3. Interim vacancies on the judicial screening committee for each appellate division
judicial department shall be filled in the manner prescribed in subdivision two of this section,
with the chief judge of the court of appeals selecting a member to fill the first vacancy and
the presiding justice of the appellate division for that district selecting a member to the next
vacancy (not necessarily in the same year).
4. In making each selection to the judicial screening committee for each appellate
division judicial department, the selecting official shall attempt to satisfy the requirements
of section forty-six-f of this article in the light of the then present make-up of the judicial
screening committee for that judicial department.
5. Each member of each judicial screening committee for each appellate division judicial department shall be selected to serve a single term of five years except that the initial
selections to the judicial screening committee shall include two persons selected to serve for
five years, two persons selected to serve for only four years, two persons selected to serve for
only three years, two persons selected to serve for only two years and two persons selected to
serve for only one year, so that thereafter the terms of two members shall expire each year.
§ 46-e. Selection and composition of judicial screening committee for the court of appeals. 1. The judicial screening committee for the court of appeals and the court of claims
shall consist of ten persons, four of whom shall be selected by the chief judge of the court of
appeals, one of whom shall be selected by the presiding justice of the appellate division for
each judicial department, and two of whom shall be selected by the governor of the state.
2. Selections to the judicial screening committee for the court of appeals shall be made
alternately by the selecting officials as vacancies occur on the judicial screening committee
for that judicial department with the chief judge of the court of appeals making the first such
selection, the presiding justice of the appellate division for the first judicial department
making the next such selection, the chief judge of the court of appeals making the next
selection, the presiding justice of the appellate division for the second judicial department
making the next selection, the governor making the next selection, the chief judge of the court
of appeals making the next selection, the presiding justice of the third judicial department
making the next selection, the chief judge of the court of appeals making the next selection,
the presiding justice of the appellate division for the fourth judicial department making the
next selection, and the governor making the last selection.
3. Interim vacancies on the judicial screening committee for the court of appeals shall
be filled in the manner and order prescribed in subdivision two of this section, with the chief
judge of the cour&of appeals selecting a member to fill the first vacancy and the presiding
justices of the appellate division and the governor selecting members to the next vacancies
(not necessarily in the same year) as they occur.
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4. In making each selection to the judicial screening committee for the court of appeals
the selecting official shall attempt to satisfy the requirements of section forty-six-f of this
article in the light of the then present make-up of the judicial screening committee for that
judicial department.
5. Each member of each judicial screening committee for the court of appeals shall be
selected to serve a single term of five years except that of the initial selections to the judicial
screening committee, the first two persons selected shall serve for only one year, the next two
persons selected shall serve for only two years, the next two persons selected shall serve for
only three years, the next two persons selected shall serve for only four years and the last two
persons selected shall serve for five years, so that thereafter the terms of two members shall
expire each year.
§ 46-f. Nature of judicial screening committees. 1. The members of each judicial screening committee provided for in this article shall be selected so as to assure that it is politically
non-partisan and so as to attempt to make it representative, to the extent reasonably feasible,
of the judicial district or judicial department or other area for which it serves in terms of the
racial, religious, geographic, political and ethnic make-up thereof. In this regard, no more
than seven persons from any fifteen member committee and no more than four persons from
any ten person committee may be a registered member of any one political party; and at least
forty percent of each committee shall consist of persons who are not members of the bar; and
the membership of each committee shall include both men and women.
2. No member of any judicial screening committee shall hold any elected or appointed
public office or office in any political party or other political organization during his or her
tenure on the committee.
3. No person shall be a member of more than one judicial screening committee at any
one time.
4. All members of each judicial screening committee shall be residents of the judicial
district or judicial department or other area for which it serves, except that a practicing
member of the bar of this state who is also a resident of this state may be a member of a
judicial screening committee for the judicial district or judicial department or other area in
which he or she maintains his or her principal law office even if he or she is not a resident
thereof.
5. Members of the judical screening committees shall not receive any compensation for
such service but shall be reimbursed for any necessary expenses incurred by them in the
performance of their duties on the judicial screening committees.
§ 46-g. Qualifications of candidates and nominees for judicial office. In determining
whether a candidate or nominee for judicial office is "qualified" for purposes of this article,
the judicial screening committees shall consider, among other things, the following characteristics of such candidate or nominee: legal ability and aptitude; ability to articulate verbally
and in writing; litigation and other professional experience and published writings in the
practice, administration or teaching of law; temperament and demeanor; industry and diligence; fairness and impartiality; knowledge of and readiness to adhere to the code of judicial
conduct; honesty; freedom from conflict of interest; independence and decisiveness; integrity;
moral and professional character; and physical and mental health. Without limiting the
grounds for certifying or refusing to certify any candidate or nominee as "qualified", no
candidate or nominee shall be certified as "qualified" if he is found to be lacking in the
foregoing categories of qualifications.
§ 46-h. Reports and procedures of the judicial screening committee. 1. All candidates
or nominees for judicial office on any court subject to the provisions of this article shall submit
to pre-selection screening by the judicial screening committee responsible for that court as
provided in this article at least forty-five days prior to the judicial election or appointment
in question.
2. The failure of any candidate or nominee for judicial office to submit to the procedures
of the judicial screening committee or to cooperate therewith shall be a sufficient ground for
refusing to certify such candidate as "qualified" for such office for purposes of this article.
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3. At least fifteen days prior to any such judicial election or appointment, the judicial
screening committee involved shall release to the public a written report stating which candidates or nominees therefor it certifies as "qualified" together with a detailed explanation of
the grounds and reasons for its decision to certify or not to certify each such candidate or
nominee; any other member of the judicial screening committee may (but shall not be required to) add as part of the published report his own concurring or dissenting opinion with
respect to any aspect thereof.
4. In conducting its investigation into the qualifications of any candidate or nominee
for judicial office the judicial screening committees shall have the right, in their discretion,
to ask the candidate or nominee to submit written answers to questions, reasonably related
to the inquiry involved, and to require that the candidate or nominee submit to a personal
interview before the members of the judicial screening committee.
5. Any candidate or nominee for judicial office may insist that the judicial screening
committee grant him a personal interview prior to releasing its report with regard to his
prospective election or appointment and shall be granted such a personal interview if he or
she so desires.
6. In determining whether a candidate or nominee for judicial office is "qualified", a
majority vote of the members of the judicial screening committee involved shall control; the
votes of each member of the committee shall be recorded in the written report issued by the
committee with respect to each such candidate or nominee.
7. Each judicial screening committee shall have the right to adopt, by majority vote
thereof, for itself such additional fair and reasonable procedures as it deems prudent and
appropriate for the fulfillment of its duties and responsibilities under this article.
8. Each judicial screening committee shall have the power to subpoena witnesses to
appear to testify before it and produce any records reasonably related to the inquiries currently before it, provided that it provides reimbursement for the reasonable costs necessitated
by compliance at the same rate as that provided by the Civil Practice Law and Rules for trial
witnesses. Such subpoenas shall be enforced or reviewed by the courts, if necessary, in the
same manner and to the same degree as nonjudicial subpoenas issued under the Civil Practice
Law and Rules.
§ 46-i. Staffing and funding of judicial screening committees. The New York State
Assembly and New York State Senate shall take such steps, promptly after enactment of this
article, with the cooperation of the governor and his staff, the chief judge of the court of
appeals, and the office of court administration and its staff, as are necessary to adequately
staff and fund each of the judicial screening committees, so that it is sufficiently able to
undertake and competently perform the functions intended for it as provided in this article.
§ 46-j. Removal. 1. Any member of any judicial screening committee who is found to
be lacking in fairness, moral character, honesty, impartiality, diligence or responsibility may
be removed from such committee either by a two-thirds vote of such committee or by unanimous agreement among the officials charged, at the time of such removal, with selection of
members to such judicial screening committee. 2. Nothing in this article is intended or shall
be construed to limit in any way the procedures otherwise set forth in the laws of this state
for removal of or other disciplinary action with respect to sitting judges or justices or other
public officials.

